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ABSTRACT 
The conventional wisdom among economists and development 
scholars is that strong formal property rights are a necessary 
precondition for economic growth.  By way of a thorough analysis 
of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to property 
rights and economic development, this Article questions this 
wisdom and argues instead for a more nuanced and context-
dependent approach to the understanding of the relationship 
between property rights and development.  The first part of this 
Article argues that in certain cases, the costs of creating a formal 
property rights regime outweigh the benefits derived from that 
regime.  The second part argues that property rights regimes 
cannot be viewed as isolated institutions which are independent 
from other social institutions, but rather that the success of a formal 
property rights regime is contingent upon the successful operation 
of a number of other institutions.  Finally, the third part examines 
the process of transition from an informal to a formal property 
rights regime and argues that the appropriate model for facilitating 
that transition crucially depends on the reason for the perpetuation 
of the informal regime. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The substantial body of economic development literature that 
has accumulated over the past several decades has examined a 
myriad of factors in seeking to provide both a descriptive account 
of what causes growth as well as prescriptive policies for what 
poor countries should do to catch up with richer states.  Although 
few would contend that any one policy can raise the standards of 
living of those in the world’s poorest countries to levels 
comparable to those in the world’s richest countries, it has become 
conventional wisdom amongst most economists that, whatever else 
the state does, it should provide effective institutions and processes 
to protect private property rights and enforce contracts, which are 
regarded as pre-requisites to efficient and dynamic market 
economies.  In the words of two prominent law and economics 
scholars in a forthcoming book, Law and the Poverty of Nations, 
“inadequate institutions to enforce property and contract law is the 
most pervasive and fundamental defect in the legal framework of 
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poor countries.”1  On this view, law plays a critical role in 
promoting economic development and should be accorded the 
highest developmental priority.  One of the Authors has examined 
the contract enforcement pillar of these claimed preconditions to 
economic growth elsewhere.2  Here, the Authors address the 
property rights protection pillar of this conventional wisdom. 
The significance of property rights for economic growth has 
been the subject of much writing by development theorists and 
policy-makers alike.  The so-called “Washington Consensus” 
identified property rights reform as one of the major areas of 
reform for the developing world.3  The World Bank has similarly 
highlighted the importance of property rights, and has supported 
and financed programs for the formalization of property rights and 
the creation of titling systems to secure such rights.4  While some of 
the research emanating from the World Bank in recent years has 
advocated a more nuanced approach to its policies relating to 
property rights and development,5 other documents have seemed 
to follow its traditional attitude that the formalization of property 
rights is virtually always desirable.6 
 
1 ROBERT COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, LAW AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 12); see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW—GROWTH 
NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 91 (2006) (“Proponents of 
the rule of law in the contest of economic development often express the core of 
their position . . . by emphasizing the need to ‘enforce contracts and protect 
property rights.’”). 
2 See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and 
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2006) (discussing 
“whether the existence of a formal contract law and enforcement regime 
significantly contributes to economic growth in developing countries”). 
3 See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN 
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 17 (John Williamson ed., 
1990) (noting property rights as an area of insecurity that needs to be corrected in 
Latin America). 
4 World Bank, World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for 
Everyone, 2 (2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005 
/Resources/complete_report.pdf; see also Ahmed Galal & Omar Razzaz, Reforming 
Land and Real Estate Markets 20–21 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 
No. 2616, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636201 (assessing the World Bank’s experiences with 
formalizing property rights in developing nations). 
5 See KLAUS DEININGER, LAND POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
5–6 (2003) (finding “a considerable evolution and increased sophistication” in the 
recent recommendations for property reform). 
6 See e.g., World Bank, supra note 4, at 80–84 (outlining measures to achieve 
formalization of property rights). 
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Perhaps most reflective of the importance that property rights 
have acquired in contemporary thinking on economic development 
has been the success and influence of Hernando De Soto’s The 
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, which argues that strong protection for private 
property rights is the key factor that explains the developed 
world’s economic success.7  Indeed, on De Soto’s account, the 
potential benefits of formalization are significant.  De Soto claims 
that “the total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by 
the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at 
least $9.3 trillion,” which he characterizes as “dead capital.”8 
This broad assertion is unsatisfactory, however, as it leaves a 
great deal of indeterminacy in terms of the actual policies implied 
by the claim.  The theoretical and empirical literature which has 
emerged in support of this claim has been used by some to 
advocate titling and registration programs as a general solution to 
the problem of property rights insecurity.  This Article will argue 
that this blanket approach towards the establishment of stronger 
property rights is unwarranted and counterproductive.  Rather, the 
Authors will argue that a more nuanced approach is required to 
craft successful development policies regarding property rights.  
To that end, this Article will present, and seek to provide answers 
to, three questions that must be asked regarding the process of 
strengthening property rights regimes. 
First, do the benefits of formalizing property rights outweigh 
the costs of doing so at all stages of development?  While there are 
compelling theoretical reasons—supported by numerous 
econometric studies—to believe that a number of economic 
benefits emerge from formal property regimes, there are also a 
number of economic and social costs which arise in creating and 
maintaining such regimes.  The assumption that the benefits will 
always outweigh the costs is unwarranted; it is thus important to 
examine the conditions under which this assumption will hold.  
The answer to the first question also necessarily involves an 
examination of the form that a property rights regime might take, 
 
7 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 218 (2000); see also Madeleine Albright, It’s 
Time For Empowerment, in THE WORLD IN 2007, at 65 (2006) (noting that property 
right reform is essential to economic success for the third world). 
8 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 35. 
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as many of the costs and benefits depend on specific aspects of the 
property regime in question. 
Second, what social, economic, political, and legal 
preconditions are necessary for a formal property rights regime to 
function effectively?  A formal property regime cannot exist in a 
vacuum at the state level, but rather it requires the existence of a 
number of complementary institutions, including an effective 
police force, a strong judiciary, and other similar institutions.  Yet it 
is also important not to ignore the importance of informal norms 
and codes of behavior.  The existence of social norms, which are 
not in serious conflict with the formal regime, may in fact be a 
precondition for an effective formal property system.  Thus, it is 
important to understand the preconditions, both at the state and 
societal level, which are necessary for a formal property regime to 
operate as envisioned by policy-makers. 
Third, how does the process of reforming property rights 
regimes actually occur?  The answer to this question depends on 
the process by which property rights regimes change over time.  If, 
as some authors have argued, property rights regimes will evolve 
naturally over time, then there may be a limited role for 
intentionally designed reforms in shaping them.  By contrast, if 
various factors can shape this evolutionary process, then 
intentionally designed reforms may have a more significant role to 
play.  Answering this question will therefore also involve an 
analysis of the different impediments to this evolutionary process, 
as well as an exploration of the differing responses that may be 
required. 
This Article will proceed by examining each of these questions 
in turn, exploring both theoretical considerations as well as 
empirical evidence. 
2. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
REGIME 
2.1. The Benefits of a Formal Property Rights Regime 
2.1.1. The Benefits of Secure Property Arrangements 
Before moving to questions about the nature of an optimal 
property rights regime, it is first important to highlight briefly 
some of the reasons why property has occupied such a prominent 
place in the development literature in recent years.  While much of 
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the literature has made sweeping claims about the benefits of 
private property, the literature has also disaggregated the benefits 
by analyzing the number of distinct economic benefits which 
private property can bring. 
Prior to outlining these separate benefits, it should be noted 
that it is simplistic to speak of private property rights as a whole as 
leading to economic growth.  As many authors have pointed out, 
one’s property over an object can typically be disaggregated into a 
number of rights, none of which need necessarily go together.  In 
examining issues related to property rights and development, 
however, it is sufficient to use Eggertsson’s aggregation of these 
rights into three broad categories: the exclusive right to use an 
asset, the right to appropriate its economic value, and the right to 
sell or otherwise alienate that asset.9  Indeed, most of the issues 
discussed below can be linked to one of these three rights. 
It is also important to note that these rights are not 
dichotomous, but rather can exist in property to varying degrees of 
security.  This is especially the case with the first two rights, which 
can be grouped together for practical purposes in the concept of 
tenure security.  In this formulation, the stronger one’s exclusive 
right to use and appropriate the economic value of the land, the 
more secure one’s tenure is.  Indeed, security of tenure will be used 
frequently below to refer to strong protection of one’s exclusive 
rights to use and benefit from the asset in question.  By contrast, 
tenure insecurity refers to a situation where one’s claims to 
property are likely not to be respected.  This insecurity can arise 
from either a) other individuals not respecting an individual’s 
claim to his property and claiming that property as their own or 
otherwise encroaching on it, or b) the state not respecting an 
individual’s claim to that land and expropriating that land.10  
Having clarified some of these distinctions, some of the often-cited 
benefits of secure property rights will be highlighted. 
 
9 THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 34–35 (1990). 
10 See THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS 
OF REFORM 182 (2005) (noting that property insecurity arises when states do not 
enforce a person’s rights against an encroacher or from the state taking the land 
without compensation). 
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2.1.1.1. Exclusive Use Leads to the Resources Being Used 
Efficiently 
There are two mechanisms through which various bundles of 
private property rights lead to resources being used in the most 
efficient way possible.  The first claim is that because private 
property leads individuals to fully internalize the costs and 
benefits of their use of an asset, the existence of private property 
will lead people to use resources in the most socially efficient 
way.11  When the protection of property rights over a given 
resource is weak, significant inefficiencies in the use and 
exploitation of that resource can arise.  First, where numerous 
individuals are using the same resource, that resource may be 
overexploited, as individuals will not consider the detrimental 
effects on others from their own decisions related to resource use.12  
Second, where no property rights are assigned to a resource, 
individuals may have an incentive to appropriate that resource as 
quickly as possible lest others appropriate it first; this can lead to 
inefficient and wasteful resource mining.13  Third, a lack of secure 
 
11 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 348–49 (1967) (discussing how private property rights force the owner of 
these rights to internalize the costs of their actions); see also Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 24 (1973) 
(“[P]rivate rights can be socially useful precisely because they encourage persons 
to take account of social costs.”) (emphasis omitted); R. H. Coase, The Federal 
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27–35 (1959) (arguing that the use of 
a pricing system for the assignment of broadcast frequencies would lead to a more 
efficient allocation than government regulated assignments); Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (discussing how communal 
property allows people to push social costs such as pollution onto society as a 
whole).  Proponents of new institutional economics have also examined this claim.  
One proponent, Douglass North, argues that private property rights raise the 
private rate of return of an activity closer to the social rate of return, thereby 
spurring economic growth.  DOUGLASS NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 6 (1981) (“The existence of a positive return to savings is also 
dependent on the structure of property rights.”). 
12 See ERIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY: 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 111–16 (2d ed. 2005) 
(summarizing the problems that arise under common ownership of resources). 
13 See Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 77 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003) (“In effect, the now-or-never motive drives actors to 
deplete nonrenewable resources without due attention to optimal time 
preferences and patterns of demand.”).  For a formal demonstration of this point, 
see Louis Hotte, Conflicts Over Property Rights and Natural-Resource Exploitation at 
the Frontier, 66 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2001), who models resource use in the case of 
insecure ownership and shows that where landowners believe that they may lose 
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property rights over a certain type of asset may lead parties to 
make socially suboptimal asset allocations, as they might invest in 
assets which have lower returns but which are easier to protect.14  
Thus, these claims suggest that the stronger private property is, in 
the sense of private ownership and allowing individuals to capture 
the returns from their efforts, the greater the efficiency in the 
exploitation and use of a resource will be. 
It is important to note, however, that under certain economic 
conditions, both open-access systems, where no one is excluded, 
and communal property arrangements, where non-members are 
excluded, can be economically efficient arrangements.15  For 
example, a system of open access to land could be a rational 
response to economic forces if land were not a scarce good, as in 
such circumstances, there is no benefit to creating formal 
individual property rights, while there would be a cost.16  
Similarly, if land is only somewhat scarce and a community is 
relatively small, communal property arrangements may combine 
the benefits of socially efficient alternatives through collective 
 
their access to a resource in the near future, they may exploit the resource in a 
socially wasteful manner. 
  On a related point, where individuals face tenure insecurity, they may not 
make socially-optimal investments for the long-term protection or sustainability 
of a particular resource or the environment generally because they are uncertain 
ex ante about their likelihood of appropriating the benefits of such investments.  
For example, Gebremedhin and Swinton show that the probability of farmers 
making long-term investments in soil conservation measures in Ethiopia was 
related to their perceived degree of tenure security in their land.  Berhanu 
Gebremedhin & Scott M. Swinton, Investment in Soil Conservation in Northern 
Ethiopia: the Role of Land Tenure Security and Public Programs, 29 AGRIC. ECON. 69 
(2003). 
14 See Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property Rights, and 
Growth 58 J. FIN. 2401, 2402 (2003) (“[O]ur idea of property rights is the degree of 
protection of the return on assets against powerful competitors.”). 
15 See DAM, supra note 1, at 151 (“It would be a mistake, however, to conclude 
that all communal ownership is so inefficient that it is an obstacle to economic 
development.”); see also Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332 
(1993) (noting the advantages of communal ownership); see generally DEININGER, 
supra note 5, at 29 (discussing generally some of the factors which can lead group 
rights to be more efficient than individual rights). 
16 See Omotunde E.G. Johnson, Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and 
Land Tenure Systems, 15 J.L. & ECON. 259, 271 (1972) (arguing that in certain 
circumstances communal property systems allow for more cost savings than 
personal property). 
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action with lower enforcement and transaction costs than 
individual property rights.17 
The second mechanism through which strong property rights 
promote efficiency is that when the land over which one has strong 
private property rights is also alienable, the land can be transferred 
from less efficient users to individuals who will put it to more 
efficient uses.18  Because the land is more economically valuable to 
the more efficient user, mutually beneficial trades should be 
possible wherein land is transferred from less efficient users to 
more efficient users. 
 
2.1.1.2.   Security of Tenure and Easy Transferability of Property  
 Increase Access to Credit 
 
The linkage between property and access to credit is another 
economic aspect of property that has been extensively explored.  
Indeed, one of De Soto’s main arguments in The Mystery of Capital 
is that secure property rights allow individuals to use their 
possessions as sources of capital.19  As Feder and Onchan note, 
creditors will be much more likely to provide credit where that 
credit can be secured with collateral.  Property, however, whether 
real or personal, can only be effective collateral if creditors believe 
that they will be able to gain possession of this collateral in the 
event of the debtor’s default.20  Thus, the debtor must have secure 
ownership of the property and have the ability to easily transfer it 
to the creditor. 
A lack of access to credit can significantly impair economic 
development.  Without access to credit, the requisite capital may 
 
17 See Gershon Feder & David Feeny, Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory 
and Implications for Development Policy, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 135, 143 (1991) 
(discussing how voluntary collective action in a communal property arrangement 
enabled an efficient solution to a problem). 
18 See Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Institutions and Land Markets 7 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2014, 1999) (“[T]here is some 
evidence that a higher degree of transfer rights provides additional incentives for 
investments and for more efficient use . . . .”). 
19 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that property rights allow Western 
nations to “inject[] life into assets and make[] them generate capital”). 
20 Gershon Feder & Tongroj Onchan, Land Ownership Security and Farm 
Investment in Thailand, 69 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 311, 311 (1987); see also Heywood 
Fleisig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, 33 FIN. & DEV. 44, 45 (1996) 
(discussing how enhanced land ownership security makes lenders more likely to 
extend credit). 
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not be available to finance individuals’ investments, thereby 
preventing individuals from making profitable investments.  
According to De Soto, in the United States, “up to 70 percent of the 
credit new businesses receive comes from using formal titles as 
collateral for mortgages.”21  Even where creditors do not require 
property as collateral, the interest rate on that credit may be higher, 
reflecting the higher risk which creditors face when making 
unsecured loans.  Projects which would have been financed at the 
lower interest rate available for secured loans may become 
unprofitable or may be deemed too risky at the higher rate for 
unsecured credit. 
It should be noted, however, that while formal title can increase 
the supply of credit, it may not immediately lead to greater 
borrowing if demand for credit is limited.  Even complete security 
and alienability of land may not improve access to credit if 
landholders are risk-averse and perceive a risk of losing their land 
if it is mortgaged.22  This problem is especially acute when 
landowners have no access to insurance or alternative sources of 
wealth.23 
2.1.1.3. Security of Tenure Increases Incentives for Investment 
The increase in investment is perhaps the most discussed of the 
beneficial effects of strong property rights.24  There are three 
distinct ways in which stronger property rights can increase 
 
21 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 84. 
22 Jean-Philippe Platteau, Does Africa Need Land Reform?, in EVOLVING LAND 
RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 51, 59 (Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan eds., 
2000).  The ability to use land as collateral may actually be detrimental to smaller 
farmers. Eric Van Tassel’s model shows that where farmers have limited income, 
they may not be willing to risk losing their land in order to acquire loans.  
Creditors, however, may be unwilling to provide unsecured loans to such 
farmers, as they may perceive the farmer’s preference for an unsecured loan over 
a secured loan as indicating that the farmer poses a high risk of default.  Eric Van 
Tassel, Credit Access and Transferable Land Rights, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 151, 
151–53 (2004). 
23 See Stephen R. Boucher et al., The Impact of “Market-Friendly” Reforms on 
Credit and Land Markets in Honduras and Nicaragua, 33 WORLD DEV. 107, 111 (2004) 
(indicating that “land-poor households” may be unwilling to take out loans 
without insurance because of the risk of collateral loss). 
24 One of the most often cited papers in the contemporary literature on the 
theoretical and formal underpinnings of this effect is Besley’s work, in which he 
formally models the relationship between security of tenure and investment. 
Timothy Besley, Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from 
Ghana, 103 J. POL. ECON. 903 (1995). 
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investment.  First, where tenure is more secure, individuals will be 
more likely to invest significant resources to improve their 
property and make it more productive.  Second, where property is 
alienable, individuals have greater incentives to improve property 
because they will be able to realize a gain from that improvement 
upon selling it.  Finally, where property is secure and alienable, the 
supply of credit is increased, thereby giving individuals access to 
the capital necessary to improve their land.25 
2.1.1.4. Security of Tenure Decreases Inefficient Competition for 
Resources 
Where property is relatively secure, two types of socially 
wasteful activities can be eliminated.  First, where property rights 
are insecure, individuals may attempt to invade others’ land or 
steal their assets for themselves.  Second, and in response to this 
threat, individuals will have to expend resources to protect their 
own property from such depredations; perhaps the most 
destructive version of this type of private protection is the property 
protection provided by organized crime.26  Even where outright 
conflict does not occur, insecurity may induce individuals to 
expend resources on legal action trying to assert ownership claims 
to contested property.27  This reasoning implies that more secure 
and well-defined property may lead individuals to substitute away 
from unproductive conflict over property towards productive 
activities.28 
 
25 Platteau, supra note 22. 
26 See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An 
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 
(2000) (“Organized crime . . . is the dark side of private ordering—an 
entrepreneurial response to the inefficiencies in the property rights and 
enforcement framework supplied by the state.”). 
27 See Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing 
Countries, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647, 654–55 (1998) (suggesting that uncertainty 
over land interests, like ill-defined boundaries, often leads to litigation, especially 
in the absence of effective land registration systems). 
28 See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in 
Peru, 122 Q. J. ECON. 1561 (2007) (suggesting that formal property rights will 
increase household labor supply since individuals will have to spend less time 
informally enforcing their property claims); see also DE SOTO, supra note 7, 171–74 
(arguing that formal property rights allow individuals to focus on “their assets’ 
economic potential”); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE 
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 160 (June Abbott trans., 1989). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/1
2008] PROPERTY RIGHTS 409 
 
2.1.2. The Necessity of a Formal Property Rights Regime 
Many development scholars and policymakers contend that the 
benefits of private property described above are best achieved by a 
formal state-run property system.  Indeed, the intellectual tradition 
of viewing the state as being necessary for the enforcement of 
claims to private property has a long genesis.29  Hobbes viewed the 
existence of a powerful state as necessary to overcome the anarchy 
that would prevail in a state of nature.30  Locke similarly viewed 
the primary purpose of the state as being one of protecting 
individuals’ property, i.e. their life, liberty, and estate.31  In The 
Wealth of Nations, Smith viewed administering justice as an 
important role for government, which in part, for Smith, meant the 
protection of private property rights.32  Although Hume viewed 
property rights as conventions that all would respect for the benefit 
of society as a whole, he also recognized that individuals’ short-
sightedness might inhibit their ability to respect such conventions.  
He thus argued that the principal purpose of government was to 
overcome this short-sightedness by enforcing conventions such as 
property and contract.33 
A number of modern law and economics scholars have also 
emphasized the importance of strong property rights in economic 
development.  Posner emphasizes the importance of developing 
strong property rights regimes for fostering economic growth,34 
and North suggests that strong property rights are one of the most 
 
29 For a brief intellectual history of property rights and economics, see Edwin 
G. West, Property Rights in the History of Economic Thought: From Locke to J.S. Mill, in 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 20. 
30 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 189–91 (Richard Tuck ed., Penguin Books 
1985) (1651) (describing a system of laws necessary to bring man out of a state of 
nature). 
31 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 86–88 (Thomas P. 
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) (stating the necessity of the state for 
protecting private property). 
32 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 901–02 (Edwin Cannan ed., 
Bantam Dell 2003) (1776) (describing the importance of such government 
functions as taxing private property). 
33 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in HUME’S MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 69-80, 97-101 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1962). 
34 See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 
13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1 (2003) (“A modernizing nation’s economic 
prosperity requires at least a modest legal infrastructure centered on the 
protection of property and contract rights.”). 
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important institutions for growth.35  Similarly, Knack and Keefer 
claim that “[f]ew would dispute that the security of property and 
contractual rights and the efficiency with which governments 
manage the provision of public goods and the creation of 
government policies are significant determinants of the speed with 
which countries grow.”36  McCloskey in discussing England’s 
economic development states, “[i]f the word ‘precondition’ as it is 
used in the literature of economic growth includes anything it 
must include the formation of the legal institutions of private 
property . . . .”37 
Perhaps the best-known contemporary advocate of strong 
formal property rights in spurring development has been De 
Soto.38  Speaking of titling, he says that “[i]t is the unavailability of 
these essential representations that explains why people who have 
adapted every other Western invention, from the paper clip to the 
nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to 
make their domestic capitalism work.”39  Similarly, he writes that 
“[t]he formal property system is capital’s hydroelectric plant.”40 
Although these views reflect the prevalence of the belief that 
formal property rights are necessary for economic development, it 
is important to specify why formal property rights, rather than 
more informal property arrangements, as discussed below, are 
viewed as a sine qua non of development.  Formal property regimes 
are considered by these authors to be essential to economic growth 
because, when fully functional and accessible, they provide clearer 
and more secure allocations of property rights than could any 
informal measures to protect private property.41  Where there is a 
credible third-party enforcer of property rights—in particular, the 
state—”uncertainty is reduced or completely eliminated.”42  
 
35 NORTH, supra note 11, at 6 (“The security of property rights has been a 
critical determination of the rate of saving and capital formation.”). 
36 Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 207 
(1995). 
37 Donald McCloskey, The Enclosure of Open Fields: Preface to a Study of Its 
Impact on the Efficiency of English Agriculture in the Eighteenth Century, 32 J. ECON. 
HIST. 15, 16 (1972). 
38 See generally DE SOTO, supra note 7. 
39 Id. at 7. 
40 Id. at 47. 
41 See generally Johnson, supra note 16; Dam, supra note 1. 
42 NORTH, supra note 11, at 36. 
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Indeed, it seems intuitive that a state-backed title registry would 
have the capacity to provide the most secure property rights, given 
the extensive adjudicative and coercive capacities that one 
associates with a fully-functioning state.  Moreover, a formal 
property system can also reduce transaction costs in market 
interactions by providing increased information to third parties 
about the rights that an individual has over land.  Thus, many 
contend that a formal property regime is necessary to provide the 
benefits of private property. 
2.1.3.  Informal Mechanisms for Securing the Benefits of Private 
Property 
A formal property rights regime may not be the only method of 
securing the benefits discussed above.  Indeed, informal 
mechanisms may provide many of the same benefits as a private 
property rights regime. Within the literature examining informal 
mechanisms as a substitute for formal mechanisms, there are two 
strands of literature that explore how this can occur.  Although 
they are in many ways linked, they differ in some respects.43  First, 
the game theoretic literature explores how cooperation can emerge 
as a result of repeated interactions among individuals.  Second, the 
law and social norms literature examines the development of 
informal norms as a mechanism of social order and control.  Both 
of these sets of literature have strong implications for the 
possibility of efficient, informal property regimes, as they suggest 
that either spontaneous cooperation or informal norms can 
substitute for a formal property regime maintained by the state. 
 
43 One important difference between the game theoretic analysis of 
cooperation and the law and social norms literature is that while the former 
supposes no order and shows how people might rationally cooperate, the law and 
social norms literature examines some of the negative (e.g., gossip, violence) and 
positive (e.g., rewards) sanctions that groups may use to enforce compliance with 
a norm or convention.  For a survey of this point as well as a substantial list of 
articles which examine a variety of negative sanctions, see Richard H. McAdams 
& Eric B. Rasmusen,  Norms in Law and Economics (July 7, 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=580843 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).  Thus, while the game theoretic literature 
examines how rational cooperation can emerge because of repeated interactions, 
the law and social norms literature highlights some of the other sanctions (other 
than simply choosing not to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma) that can be used 
to maintain order, showing how incentive structures can be changed through 
decentralized mechanisms. 
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2.1.3.1. Game Theory Analysis 
One theoretical perspective examining the conditions under 
which cooperation will occur is the game theoretic perspective.  
The prisoner’s dilemma is a quintessential model of a situation in 
which parties must choose whether to cooperate or not cooperate 
with each other.  While standard game theoretic models suggest 
that cooperative outcomes will not be achieved in a one-off 
prisoner’s dilemma, Axelrod shows that mutually beneficial 
cooperative outcomes can arise in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma.44  
The general requirement for cooperation is that such games 
continue infinitely; however, Kreps et al. show how informational 
asymmetries (e.g., believing for some reason that the other players 
have a particularly cooperative disposition) can also generate 
cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma.45  Moreover, 
while the models above have assumed repeated interactions 
between the same players, Ellison shows how even this 
assumption can be relaxed, as cooperation can also emerge among 
a small group whose members are anonymously matched in each 
round of the game.46  Thus, various conditions under which 
cooperation have emerged are in many ways relatively robust.  
Experimental evidence has confirmed many of these results, 
showing, for example, that cooperation can occur even in a finitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma as individuals try to build a 
reputation for themselves.47 
 
44 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) [hereinafter 
AXELROD, EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION]; see also Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of 
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 307 (1981) [hereinafter 
Axelrod, Cooperation Among Egoists] (showing that “[w]ith an indefinite number of 
interactions, cooperation can emerge”). 
45 David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982). While the repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
has largely been viewed as involving a number (potentially infinite) of discrete 
stages, some modeling has shown cooperative results to be even more robust 
when the model is made continuous—something which is much closer to the 
reality of tenure questions addressed below. See also David M. Kreps & Robert 
Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 275 (1982) 
(arguing that uncertainty about the motivations of one or more of the players in a 
finitely repeated game can affect cooperation). 
46 Glenn Ellison, Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Anonymous Random 
Matching, 61 REV. ECON. STUD. 567 (1994). 
47 James Andreoni & John H. Miller, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely 
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103 ECON. J. 570, 571 (1993). 
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These principles are easily applicable to a regime of respect for 
property.  The issue of respecting land tenure can be thought of as 
a prisoner’s dilemma: all parties gain when tenure is respected 
(because of the lower costs associated with defending one’s land, 
etc.), but each party has an incentive not to respect other parties’ 
tenure.  The exploitation of communal resources has also been 
viewed in this way.48  While the pessimistic predictions of the 
prisoner’s dilemma have been used in the past to argue for a strong 
state to enforce order (dating back to Hobbes’ Leviathan), if 
cooperation can emerge as discussed above, this problem can be 
overcome without the state’s intervention.49  Rational self-interest 
rather than the coercive power of the state may lead parties to 
respect socially efficient property arrangements. 
The evolutionary game theory approach also has implications 
for property rights considerations.  Axelrod uses this approach and 
shows that a strategy of “tit-for-tat” (cooperation in the first round 
followed by playing whatever strategy the other player played in 
the previous round) is a collectively stable strategy.50  Axelrod also 
shows how a relatively small cluster of individuals playing “tit-for-
tat” can invade a population that is primarily comprised of 
defectors.  In the context of property rights, this suggests a 
plausible mechanism for how cooperation and mutual respect can 
emerge and how it might be collectively stable.  Cooperative play 
(i.e., respect for land tenure) might emerge, since even small 
groups which decide to respect land tenure might be more 
successful than those groups which do not respect tenure, and 
thereby come to dominate larger populations. 
2.1.3.2. The Law and Social Norms Literature 
In addition to the game-theoretic framework discussed above, 
the law and social norms literature provides an alternative 
explanation of how efficient property arrangements could emerge 
outside of a formal, legal framework.  An important perspective in 
this line of literature is Ellickson’s examination of how various 
informal rules can emerge which in certain circumstances make the 
 
48 Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1388–91; Hardin, supra note 11, at 1245. 
49 See Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1366 (providing a narrative of how this type 
of cooperation might emerge). 
50 For a discussion of evolutionary stability in the biological context, see J. 
Maynard Smith, The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, 47 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 209 (1974). 
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formal legal system irrelevant.51  Ellickson predicts that when 
social relations are close-knit, informal norms will encourage 
people in non-zero-sum situations to make choices that will conjoin 
to produce the maximum aggregate objective payoff to the group 
by minimizing deadweight losses and transaction costs.52  This has 
led Ellickson to suggest that lawmakers should defer to these 
informal norms, as the norms are more likely to be welfare 
maximizing than centrally crafted rules.53  Epstein reaches a similar 
conclusion, noting that “custom should be followed in those cases 
in which there are repeat and reciprocal interactions between the 
same parties, for then their incentives to reach the correct rule are 
exceedingly powerful.”54  These arguments imply that customary 
arrangements can be sufficient to generate order between parties. 
Although Ellickson’s theory rather optimistically predicts that 
such norms will emerge, it does not provide a strong explanation 
of the processes that determine when and why these norms emerge 
and why individuals adhere to them.  McAdams suggests an 
esteem-based theory of norms, whereby a norm arises if “(1) there 
is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of 
engaging in [an action], (2) there is some risk that others will detect 
whether one engages in [that action] . . . and (3) the existence of this 
consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the 
population.”55  These conditions change the costs and benefits of 
engaging in or not engaging in an activity, and a norm will arise if 
the esteem benefit (cost) is greater than the benefit (cost) of (not) 
engaging in the activity.  Eric Posner presents an alternative 
signaling-based model of norms, whereby social norms arise from 
the actions of individuals who are trying to signal to others that 
they are a cooperative type in order to gain benefits from 
 
51 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW]. 
52 Id. at ch.10.  See also Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing 
Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989) 
(arguing that “when people are situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to 
develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth maximizing”). 
53 ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at ch. 10. 
54 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and 
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 126 (1992). 
55 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997). 
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interactions with those individuals.56  Although the two theories 
have differences, they both highlight that a cooperative and 
welfare-enhancing norm can arise through the rational actions of a 
large number of individuals.  Moreover, over time these norms 
may become internalized such that individuals might adhere to a 
norm even in situations where doing so might not be strictly 
rational.57 
In the context of property, this would suggest that cooperation 
might be possible which would lead to the emergence of norms 
that yield many of the benefits that are claimed to flow from formal 
property rights.  With respect to security of tenure, for example, 
this reasoning suggests that tenure security might arise among a 
close-knit group if this were a welfare-maximizing rule.  This type 
of reasoning is consistent with the literature that stresses that 
tenure security can increase in response to increasing relative 
scarcity of land, since the welfare gains from secure tenure increase 
as the scarcity of land increases.58  Similarly, Sjaastad and Bromley 
have noted the presence in many African societies of a norm that 
dictates that when an individual loses ownership of a piece of land, 
the individual taking ownership must compensate the individual 
losing ownership for the value of improvements made to the 
land.59  This norm may provide the necessary incentives to make 
improvements to land without some of the costs associated with 
greater tenure security. 
It is important to note that all of the informalist theories 
presented above relate to property relations among individuals; 
none of them relate specifically with tenure security in the sense of 
freedom from a reasonable apprehension of expropriation of land 
by the state.  In terms of this aspect of property ownership, it seems 
unlikely that an informalist would contest the fact that tenure 
security vis-à-vis the state is important, but the perception of 
 
56 Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000) 
[hereinafter POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS]. 
57 POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 56, at 43–44. 
58 Gershon Feder & Raymond Noronha, Land Rights Systems and Agricultural 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 143, 143–44 (1987) 
(arguing that scarcity of land encourages the development of mechanisms to 
secure such land); see also Demsetz, supra note 11. 
59 Espen Sjaastad & Daniel W. Bromley, Indigenous Land Rights in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Appropriation, Security and Investment Demand, 25 WORLD DEV. 549, 553 
(1997). 
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tenure security against the state might be accomplished in a variety 
of ways.  All that is required for this type of tenure security is that 
the individual not fear expropriation without compensation.  To 
this end, predictability may be more important than formal rights. 
2.1.4. Assessing the Empirical Evidence 
Having examined the theoretical perspectives of formalists and 
informalists, it is important to examine the empirical evidence 
underlying each of these positions.  A number of studies have been 
conducted which have broadly linked strong property rights and 
economic development without always specifying the causal 
mechanism or the particular property rights in question.  While 
such studies are of less value in assessing or designing particular 
property rights regimes than are empirical studies that examine 
particular rights and particular benefits, they are still worth noting, 
if only because of their prominence in the economic development 
literature. 
In his important paper on the determinants of economic 
growth, Barro asserts that strong property rights are associated 
with higher growth rates, although rather than using any direct 
measure of property rights, he uses measures of political instability 
and asserts a direct linkage of such indicators to property rights.60  
Knack and Keefer note the problem in the Barro paper and other 
earlier papers of using poor proxies for property rights, and using 
an aggregate of a number of indicators of institutional and income 
quality, they find a linkage between property rights and income.61  
Rodrik et al. find a link between strong property rights and 
growth, although they explicitly acknowledge that their results do 
not allow any conclusion to be drawn about the precise form of 
property rights that promote development.62  Similarly, Acemoglu 
and Johnson, using panel data from a number of countries, 
conclude that countries with stronger property rights—as 
measured by greater constraints on politicians and more protection 
against expropriation—have higher incomes per capita, greater 
investment rates, stronger credit markets, and more developed 
 
60 Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries, 106 Q. J. 
ECON. 407, 431–32 (1991). 
61 Knack & Keefer, supra note 36. 
62 Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131, 157–58 
(2004). 
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stock markets.63  They also find that property rights are much more 
important than strong contractual rights.64  Finally, a number of 
authors have highlighted the importance of property rights to the 
rapid economic growth of the Western world.65 
While these papers provide some empirical support for a 
linkage between strong property rights and economic growth, the 
ultimate implications of these results are relatively limited.  These 
papers all support the relatively uncontroversial claim that there is 
a linkage between effective institutions and economic growth.  
However, since the authors generally use broad measures of 
institutional quality in their estimates rather than the degree of 
formalization of property rights, none of them demonstrate that 
legally enforceable private property rights themselves are related 
to economic growth, nor do they suggest anything about the 
precise nature of effective property rights regimes. 
2.1.4.1. The Empirics of Property Rights and Efficient Use 
Much more relevant for this Article than the preceding 
literature are those papers which attempt to link empirically formal 
property regimes to the specific benefits of private property 
discussed above.  The evidence appears mixed in respect to the 
linkage between formal property rights and efficient use of 
resources.  In one of the earlier studies of this type conducted in the 
 
63 Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. 
ECON. 949, 953 (2005) (discussing positive impact of property rights institutions on 
“current economic outcomes”). 
64 Id. at 987 (finding that problems that arise due to contractual relationships 
“are largely unrelated to political relationships and to property rights 
institutions”). 
65 De Long and Shleifer link pre-18th century European economic 
development with security of property rights.  See J. Bradford De Long & Andrei 
Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial 
Revolution, 36 J.L. & ECON. 671, 679 (1993) (discussing comparatively rapid growth 
of cities with non-absolutist governments and, by implication, relatively strong 
property rights regimes).  Similarly, in a less rigorous and more narrative 
approach to analyzing economic development, North and Thomas suggest that 
sustained economic growth in the West was a result of the development of private 
property rights.  Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, An Economic Theory of 
the Growth of the Western World, 23 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 16 (1970) (arguing that 
development of property rights increased productivity, ultimately leading to the 
Industrial Revolution in Western Europe); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT 
PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 157 
(1973) (hypothesizing that efficient economic organization, including property 
rights, was key to the growth of the Western world from 900–1700). 
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developing world, Bottomley argues that the inability to capture 
the full returns from investment on communal land leads Libyan 
tribesmen to use land for animal-grazing instead of more 
productive and profitable almond-tree growing.66  In a classic 
example from Western economic history, McCloskey estimates that 
there were substantial efficiency gains from the enclosure 
movement,67 although some have disputed the magnitude of these 
gains.68  These issues continue to have relevance within developed 
countries; for example, Flanagan and Alcantara argue that weak 
and highly politicized property rights regimes on Canadian 
aboriginal reserves are a significant impediment to efficient 
resource use and economic growth.69 
There is also some empirical evidence indicating that insecure 
property rights can have a detrimental impact on businesses’ 
investment decisions.  Claessens and Laeven show that firms 
operating in areas of weak property rights protection will tend to 
have fewer intangible assets relative to tangible assets, as the latter 
are easier to protect from appropriation by other firms.70  
Moreover, they find that this asset choice has resulted in significant 
inefficiencies, with stronger growth, especially among new 
businesses, being realized in firms located in countries with 
stronger property protections and relatively higher stocks of 
intangibles.71 
In other situations, however, informal norms can result in 
efficient resource allocation and exploitation.  In their examination 
of Mexico, McCarthy et al. find that the degree to which common 
 
66 Anthony Bottomley, The Effect of the Common Ownership of Land Upon 
Resource Allocation in Tripolitania, 39 LAND ECON. 91 (1963). 
67 McCloskey, supra note 37, at 35 (noting that enclosure produced high 
returns for land owners). 
68 See, e.g., Gregory Clark, Commons Sense: Common Property Rights, Efficiency, 
and Institutional Change, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 73, 73 (1998) (arguing that “gains from 
enclosure existed only in the imaginations of wild-eyed eighteenth century 
agrarian reformers” and that, in reality, the gains from enclosure were merely 
modest). 
69 Tom Flanagan & Christopher Alcantara, Individual Property Rights on 
Canadian Indian Reserves, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 489, 530 (2004) (suggesting that 
increasing tracts of aboriginal land “will never yield their maximum benefit . . . as 
long as they are held as collective property subject to political management”). 
70 Claessens & Laeven, supra note 14, at 2402 (explaining preference for 
tangible assets in areas where property rights are weak). 
71 Id. at 2423–31.  Their results are particularly striking, as they appear to be 
robust to a number of alternative model specifications.  Id. 
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access land is subject to overgrazing by cattle is inversely related to 
the degree of cooperation between farmers,72 thereby indicating 
that cooperation can lead to efficient outcomes.  Similarly, Katz 
compares two regions of Guatemala, one with a long-standing 
population existing with informal social norms and another that is 
quite new and thus lacking those social norms.  These regions 
show that even in the absence of formal property rights, resources 
can be managed sustainably where there are unwritten social 
norms guiding their use.73  Ostrom provides a number of examples 
of relatively informal mechanisms for governing communal 
resources, thus indicating that local solutions and decision-making 
can result in efficient land use.74  For example, in Törbel, 
Switzerland, a village of only 600 people, communal space for 
cattle grazing is regulated by an Alp association which is governed 
by the villagers themselves.75  Migot-Adholla et al. similarly argue 
that the inefficiencies in communal land tenure in parts of Africa 
may be very minor.76  These examples indicate that the absence of a 
formal private property regime does not necessarily lead to 
inefficient resource use; moreover, the examples generally accord 
with the theoretical position of the informalists, such as Ellickson, 
who believe that efficient social norms are more likely to emerge 
where groups are relatively tight-knit and stable. 
With respect to the alienability of land, it is by no means clear 
that a formal property regime is necessary for the development of 
an active land market.  Some authors have argued that market-type 
 
72 Nancy McCarthy et al., Land Allocation Under Dual Individual–Collective Use 
in Mexico, 56 J. DEV. ECON. 239, 262–63 (1998). 
73 Elizabeth G. Katz, Social Capital and Natural Capital: A Comparative Analysis 
of Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management in Guatemala, 76 LAND ECON. 114, 
129 (2000) (concluding that effective informal mechanisms for combating 
externalities and managing natural capital can evolve where more formal 
property rights regimes do not exist). 
74 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–102 (1990) (offering specific case studies which support 
her thesis that informal property rights managed by locals are often just as 
effective in regulating common-pool resources as formal regulations imposed by 
the outside). 
75 Id. at 61–65.  Ostrom also provides a number of examples of Japanese 
villages that created village assemblies and utilized informal sanctions to govern 
common lands.  Id. at 65–69. 
76 Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 155, 172 (1991) 
(concluding that indigenous land rights systems are not a constraint on 
productivity). 
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mechanisms have developed in customary law, especially where 
the efficiency gains from those mechanisms are highest, i.e., where 
land is relatively scarce.77  Indeed, extreme scarcity may result in 
the development of informal land markets even where market 
transactions are illegal, such as in Rwanda.78  If active land markets 
develop endogenously in response to economic incentives, this 
implies that a formal property rights regime is not necessarily a 
precondition to the development of an efficient land market. 
While some authors have contended that market transfers will 
be inhibited without the certainty made available by formal title, in 
some circumstances customs have emerged which can, at least 
partially, substitute for formal title in creating that certainty.  
Jacoby and Minten, in their analysis of land in Madagascar, discuss 
how most land sales in rural areas were accompanied by a sales 
receipt which was signed by the village head, often with other 
witnesses present.79  This was meant to provide the buyer with 
certainty that the land had not already been sold to someone else 
and that, in the eyes of the community, the land belonged to the 
buyer.  Informal mechanisms for land transfers have also been 
documented in urban housing markets.  Similarly, in her study of 
Ho Chi Minh City, Kim finds a booming housing market, despite 
relatively weak formal property rights protection for most 
properties.  She finds that neighborhood block committees and 
ward officials play a major role in settling disputes and providing 
the requisite certainty for a land market to develop.80  Interestingly, 
 
77 For a discussion of this phenomenon in Kenya, see Richard Barrows & 
Michael Roth, Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: Theory and 
Evidence, 28 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 265, 269–70 (1990).  Where this is the case, it may 
be more efficient to recognize local mechanisms of land transfer rather than try to 
graft Western ones onto what may be functional customary institutions.  See 
Admos Chimhowu & Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights? 
Dynamics and Trajectories of Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 J. 
AGRARIAN CHANGE 346, 348 (2006) (arguing that effective land policies require 
recognition of local traditional systems of property rights). 
78 Catherine André & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable 
Stress: Rwanda Caught in the Malthusian Trap, 34 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 42 (1998) 
(noting that population growth resulted in the development of informal property 
ownership systems). 
79 Hanan G. Jacoby & Bart Minten, Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-
Effective? Evidence from Madagascar, 21 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 461, 467–68 (2007) 
(noting that the approval by the village head serves as proof of ownership). 
80 Annette M. Kim, A Market Without the ‘Right’ Property Rights: Ho Chi Minh 
City, Vietnam’s Newly-Emerged Private Real Estate Market, 12 ECON. TRANSITION 275, 
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using a hedonic price model, she also finds that while the added 
certainty of formal legal title does increase property values, this 
increase is relatively small: formal title increases the value of a 
house by 11 percent, making formal property rights more valuable 
than having a telephone connection but less valuable than having a 
toilet.81 
2.1.4.2. The Empirics of Property Rights and Access to Credit 
There have also been several studies which have examined the 
linkage between the formalization of property rights and the 
availability of credit.  In this respect, the evidence is somewhat 
mixed, although there is evidence of a linkage.  It is important to 
note the interplay between these studies and those noted above.  
While title may increase the supply of credit, it may also increase 
the demand for credit, as landowners will desire to improve their 
property. 
On the formalist side, Feder and Onchan show that in Thailand 
land title and tenure security increased access to institutional credit 
and thus led to greater capital formation.82  Field and Torero 
examine the impact of a titling program in Peru, and they find that 
title increased the loan approval rates from public lending 
institutions.83  Title did not affect the loan approval rate from 
private lending institutions, but conditional on receiving a loan, 
interest rates were significantly lower.84  The 2005 World Bank 
Development Report also asserts that “[f]armers with secure title in 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, and Thailand 
obtain larger loans on better terms than those without.”85 
By contrast, in the case of Nicaragua, Laiglesia finds a linkage 
between formal title documents and investment, but does not find 
 
301 (2004) (discussing the role played by local officials in Ho Chi Minh City’s 
informal property rights regime). 
81 Id. at 298–99. 
82 Feder & Onchan, supra note 20, at 318–20 (identifying a correlation between 
possession of land title and capital formation and credit access). 
83 Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access 
Among the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program 21 (Jan. 2004), 
available at http://rwj.harvard.edu/papers/field/Field percent20Do 
percent20Property percent20Titles percent20Increase percent20Credit....pdf 
(noting “strong positive relationship” between government loan approval and 
holding formal title to property). 
84 Id. 
85 World Bank, supra note 4, at 81. 
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that to be any evidence of greater availability of credit.86  Migot-
Adholla et al. similarly find no improvement in access to credit for 
titled land in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.87  Johnson 
finds no evidence that Mexican farmers were asset-rationed out of 
the credit market because they did not hold title.88  Carter and 
Olinto reach a more nuanced result.  In their analysis of Paraguay, 
they find that the supply of credit is differentially available in 
response to stronger title, as the credit supply effects of tenure 
security are non-existent for small farms and only begin to become 
important when farms are larger than fifteen hectares.89 
Where informal credit markets exist and at least partially 
substitute for the formal credit market, it seems that the 
importance of title is significantly diminished.  Pamuk examines 
how informal credit arrangements emerged in Trinidad, which 
serve the large section of the population without formal title.90  
Similarly, André and Platteau describe how mortgages were 
readily available in Rwanda from informal credit associations 
known as tontines, which had sufficient authority to seize the 
debtor’s lands in the event of a default, despite the absence of 
formal title.91  Even Feder and Onchan, who are otherwise staunch 
defenders of the theory that formal property rights can increase 
access to credit, acknowledge that their evidence shows that the 
impact of formal property rights on access to credit was negligible 
in one Thai province which already had a well-developed informal 
credit market.92 
 
86 Juan R. de Laiglesia, Investment and Credit Effects of Land Titling and 
Registration: Evidence from Nicaragua 22  (Research Comm. Dev. Econ., Working 
Paper No. 10, 2005), available at http://opus.zbw-kiel.de/volltexte/2005 
/3483/pdf/De_Laiglesia.pdf. 
87 Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76. 
88 Nancy L. Johnson, Tierra y Libertad: Will Tenure Reform Improve 
Productivity in Mexico’s Ejido Agriculture? 49 ECON. DEV. CULTURAL CHANGE 291, 
304 (2001). 
89 Michael R. Carter & Pedro Olinto, Getting Institutions “Right” for Whom? 
Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of 
Investment, 85 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 173, 184 (2003). 
90 Ayse Pamuk, Informal Institution Arrangements in Credit, Land Markets and 
Infrastructure Delivery in Trinidad, 24 INT’L J. URBAN REG’L RES. 379, 381–89 (2000). 
91 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 21. 
92 Feder & Onchan, supra note 20, at 315. 
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2.1.4.3. The Empirics of Property Rights and Investment 
As with the above considerations, the evidence linking formal 
property rights to increased investment is mixed.  On the one 
hand, there are a number of studies in various settings which 
suggest that formal property rights lead to increased investment.93  
On a broad level, in a cross-country regression analysis, Svensson 
finds that countries with stronger property rights had higher 
investment rates.94  On a more micro level, Besley finds some 
support for the linkage between investment and property rights in 
Ghana.95  Similarly, Alston et al., in their analysis of land in the 
Brazilian Frontier, conclude that title increases farm-specific 
investment as well as land value.96  In his analysis of Guatemala, 
Schweigert, after controlling for the availability of credit, found 
that households with formal title generated greater output and 
invested more family labor towards generating future 
production.97 
 
93 The linkage between formal property rights and investment presumes the 
existence of a relationship between tenure security and investment, as the benefit 
of formal property rights is that they are presumed to increase tenure security. 
While the latter relationship has generally been found to be strong, not all studies 
have found evidence of a strong relationship, at least where the investments are 
relatively short-term.  See Stein Holden & Hailu Yohannes, Land Redistribution, 
Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households in Southern 
Ethiopia, 78 LAND ECON. 573, 583–87 (2002) (finding no evidence of a relationship 
between perceived tenure security and the use of farm inputs in their study of 
southern Ethiopia).  Thus, in some cases the question of the degree of tenure 
security may not have a significant impact on investment.  However, while this 
may be true at the margins, it seems theoretically implausible and empirically 
incorrect to suggest that there is, at least at a broad enough level, no relationship 
between tenure security and investment.  In the extreme case, an individual who 
knows with certainty that their property will be appropriated without 
compensation tomorrow obviously has no incentive to make an investment that 
will only provide a pay-off a week in the future. 
94 Jakob Svensson, Investment, Property Rights and Political Instability: Theory 
and Evidence, 42 EUR. ECON. REV.  1317, 1336–37 (1998). 
95 Besley, supra note 24, at 936. 
96 Lee J. Alston et al., The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land 
Titles on the Brazilian Frontier, 12 J. LAW ECON. ORG. 25, 57–58 (1996). 
97 Thomas Schweigert, Land Title, Tenure Security, Investment, and Farm 
Output: Evidence from Guatemala, 40 J. DEV. AREAS 115, 123 (2006).  In an analysis of 
tenure reform in West Bengal, Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak find that a 
government registration program designed to guarantee sharecropper tenure 
significantly increased agricultural productivity.  While they speculate that a 
major reason for this increase was that the increased security gave sharecroppers 
appropriate incentives to invest in the land, their model did not allow for a precise 
investigation of the causal mechanism linking increased tenure security and 
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While most of the above studies have focused on security of 
tenure in the agricultural context, there is similar evidence linking 
tenure security to investment in urban settings.  Field finds that 
investment in housing increased significantly once title was issued 
to slum-dwellers in Peru.  She finds that this effect is independent 
of increased access to credit, because there were similar increases 
in investment among both those who received credit as well as 
those who were rationed out.98  Struyk and Lynn reach a similar 
conclusion in their analysis of housing investment in Manila.99  
However, measures other than tenure formalization may also play 
a major role in improving investment incentives.  For example, 
Varley argues that the provision of government services to 
informal urban settlements can be an adequate substitute for actual 
formalization programs, as both have the effect of increasing 
perceived security of tenure.100 
The investment decisions of firms may also be significantly 
altered by the perceived security of property rights.  For example, 
in their examination of reinvestment rates of firms’ profits in 
different countries in the former Eastern bloc, Johnson, McMillan 
and Woodruff found that entrepreneurs reinvested less of their 
retained earnings when they perceived their property rights to be 
less secure.101 
While the expectation of tenure security is almost certainly 
linked to increased investment, mechanisms other than formal title 
can in some cases be used to achieve that tenure security.  For 
example, Lanjouw and Levy find that while formal title increases 
tenure security and the value of the land, they also find that 
informal mechanisms can effectively substitute for those in certain 
 
increased productivity.  Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Empowerment and Efficiency: 
Tenancy Reform in West Bengal, 110 J. POL. ECON. 239, 240 (2002). 
98 Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums, 3 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASS’N. 279, 280–81 (2005). 
99 Raymond J. Struyk & Robert Lynn, Determinants of Housing Investment in 
Slum Areas: Tondo and Other Locations in Metro Manila, 59 LAND ECON. 444, 453 
(1983). 
100 Ann Varley, The Relationship Between Tenure Legalization and Housing 
Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City, 18 DEV. & CHANGE 463 (1987). 
101 Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1335, 
1336 (2002).  Cull and Xu conducted similar research in China and reached 
broadly similar results.  Robert Cull & Lixin Colin Xu, Institutions, Ownership, and 
Finance: The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms, 77 J. FIN. 
ECON. 117, 117 (2005). 
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situations.102  Both the increasing age of the community (indicative 
of greater time for social norms to develop) and paying a 
community organizer (a decentralized social order mechanism) 
were found to reduce the value of title.  Lanjouw and Levy thus 
suggest that titling programs should be focused on new and 
disorganized communities.  Similarly, Brock examines customary 
land tenure in Uganda and finds that in most parts of the country, 
land tenure is relatively secure under customary law; at the very 
least, customary law has not impeded the planting of coffee, which 
is a long-term cash crop requiring the expectation of relatively 
secure tenure.103  This suggests that the appropriate question in 
determining whether a property regime gives efficient investment 
incentives is not simply whether the property rights regime is a 
formal or informal regime, but rather whether there are 
mechanisms in place to provide property owners with a sufficient 
perception of security to encourage efficient investment. 
Moreover, the interpretation of the above papersthat formal 
property leads to higher investment levelsmust be made with 
some caution, as there are some papers which seem to suggest that 
the causality between formal property rights and investment may 
be reversed.  There are two mechanisms through which this may 
operate.  First, it may be the case that investments in land are 
actually made as a mechanism for improving tenure security rather 
than as a result of it.  Razzaz examines squatter settlements in 
Jordan and concludes that parties would invest in their properties 
in order to gain de facto property rights, since the state would be 
less likely to demolish completed houses.104  Second, it may be the 
case that individuals seek out greater tenure security once their 
property is more valuable or they have made more investments, 
rather than the reverse.  In these circumstances, an endogeneity 
 
102 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip I. Levy, Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal 
Property Rights in Urban Ecuador, 112 ECON. J. 986, 986 (2002). 
103 B. Brock, Customary Land Tenure, ‘Individualization’, and Agricultural 
Development in Uganda, 2 E. AFR. J.  RURAL DEV. 1 (1969).  It is important to note 
that even within customary property regimes, there may be significant differences 
in the perception of tenure security. In their study of agricultural investment in 
the Gambia, Hayes et al. find that differences in landowners’ perceptions of their 
rights over their land in customary law statistically and significantly impacted 
their levels of investment in their land.  Joseph Hayes, Michael Roth & Lydia 
Zapeda, Tenure Security, Investment and Productivity in Gambian Agriculture: A 
Generalized Probit Analysis, 79 AM. J.  AGRIC. ECON. 369, 381 (1997). 
104 Omar M. Razzaz, Examining Property Rights and Investment in Informal 
Settlements: The Case of Jordan, 69 LAND ECON. 341, 352–53 (1993). 
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bias may inflate the estimated impact of title on investment in 
many studies.  Antle et al. show that the positive effect on 
investment decisions of titling are smaller when simultaneous 
equations are used than single-equation models, which is 
consistent with the idea that the causality is reversed.105  Brasselle 
et al. similarly find that once the endogeneity bias is controlled for, 
increased land rights do not significantly increase investment.106 
2.1.4.4. The Empirics of Property Rights and Resource 
Competition 
Although research in this area is limited, there does seem to be 
cases of individuals and groups in an environment of insecure 
property rights undertaking activities solely for the purpose of 
protecting their property.  As noted above, Razzaz describes how 
squatters would attempt to erect permanent structures extremely 
quickly between state bulldozing of their settlements.107  An even 
more striking example of such an activity is examined by De Vany 
and Sanchez, who examine the fertility decisions of ejiditarios 
[residents and members of an ejido] living on communal ejidos 
[lands farmed by cooperatives] in Mexico.  They find evidence of 
greater fertility among ejiditarios than among other landowners, 
and they posit that those families choose to have more children 
because of several advantages which children provide in terms of 
securing larger property plots for those families.108  Although it is 
difficult to estimate or quantify the inefficiencies resulting from the 
above activities, they do show the existence of expenditures made 
for the protection of property claims.  Thus, insecure property 
rights may lead to socially excessive investments, as individuals 
use scarce resources on costly measures to attempt to enforce 
property claims. 
One attempt to quantify the magnitude of this inefficiency has 
been undertaken by Erica Field in her examination of the effects of 
 
105 John Antle et al., Endogeneity of Land Titling and Farm Investments: Evidence 
from the Peruvian Andes (Aug. 2003) (working paper, on file with the Montana 
State University Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics) available 
at http://www.tradeoffs.montana.edu/pdf/titling.pdf. 
106 Anne-Sophie Brasselle et al., Land Tenure Security and Investment Incentives: 
Puzzling Evidence from Burkina Faso, 67 J. DEV. ECON. 373, 375 (2002). 
107 Razzaz, supra note 104. 
108 Arthur De Vany & Nicolas Sanchez, Land Tenure Structures and Fertility in 
Mexico, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 67, 67–68 (1979). 
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the titling program in urban Peru.  Her study focuses on 
quantifying the degree to which insecure tenure forces households 
to spend time guarding their residences instead of working.  She 
finds that, after controlling for a variety of factors, newly-titled 
households worked on average forty-five hours per week more 
than non-titled households.109  Although one of the few studies of 
its kind, Field’s work provides preliminary support for believing 
that secure property rights may increase labor market 
participation. 
2.1.5. Property Rights and Growth: The Case of China 
China is an important case study in the examination of the 
relationship between protection of property rights and economic 
development, given that it has achieved dramatic rates of economic 
growth despite weak formal property rights protection.  Moreover, 
because of the sheer size and diversity of China as well as 
significant temporal and geographic variation in its policies, China 
provides an excellent example of many of the issues highlighted 
above.  Because of its importance and its recent record of economic 
growth, the case of China will be referred to throughout this 
Article.  This Section will examine many of the issues discussed 
above in the context of three different aspects of economic activity 
in China: rural land and agricultural production; urban housing 
markets; and private enterprises. 
2.1.5.1. Agricultural Production in Rural China 
In the years following the Chinese Revolution, the Chinese 
government instituted massive social changes that significantly 
impacted the agricultural sector.  Private property in rural land 
was effectively abolished by 1956, and rural agricultural 
production was organized around communes or collectives.110  
These changes provided rural inhabitants with limited incentives 
to work and failed to increase agricultural production, as 
individuals and families could not realize the benefits of increased 
labor or investment.  Similarly, because there were monitoring 
costs for production team managers and such supervision was 
consequently imperfect, there were limited penalties that 
 
109 Field, supra note 28, at 36. 
110 Samuel P.S. Ho & George C.S. Lin, Emerging Land Markets in Rural and 
Urban China: Policies and Practices, 175 CHINA Q. 681, 682–83 (2003). 
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accompanied limited effort.111  Unsurprisingly from the perspective 
of property rights formalists, grain production grew relatively 
slowly between the early 1950s and the late 1970s. 
This situation was altered dramatically with the introduction of 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in the early 1980s.  
Under the HRS, while the collective retained legal ownership of the 
land, contracts were provided to farmers and their families to give 
them use rights over the land through long-term leases.  The initial 
term of these leases were for five years, but the term was extended 
to fifteen years in 1984 and then thirty years in 1993.112  Tenure 
security was further strengthened in the 1998 revision of the Land 
Administration Law (also called the Land Management Law), 
which provided for thirty-year leases with strong restrictions on 
when readjustments could be made.113  In 2002, the Rural Land 
Contracting Law was passed, which strengthened farmers’ rights 
by not only prohibiting land readjustments in all but the most 
exceptional cases, but also by requiring the execution of written 
contracts between the collective and farmers which spelled out 
farmers’ rights.114  A new property law passed in 2007 further 
strengthened land tenure by giving farmers the right to renew their 
thirty-year leases upon expiry of the lease.115  Most recently, 
proposals put forward in October 2008 seek to reinforce private 
property rights by further strengthening tenure and by making it 
easier for farmers to transfer their land.116 
 
111 Justin Lin, The Household Responsibility System in China’s Agricultural 
Reform: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 36 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE S199, 
S206–08 (1988). 
112 PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 6 (2005). 
113 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999), art. 14, LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Land Administration Law, 1998]; Ho & 
Lin, supra note 110. 
114 Law on Rural Land Contracting (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 1, 2003) LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.); Zhu Keliang et al., The Rural Land Question in China: 
Analysis and Recommendations Based on a Seventeen-Province Survey, 38 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 761 (2006). 
115 Property Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., March 16, 2007, 
effective October 1, 2007) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.) 
[hereinafter Property Law]; Caught Between Right and Left, Town and Country, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2007. 
116 Land Reform in China: Still Not to the Tiller, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2008. 
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Although rural land rights have significantly varied over time 
and between regions,117 some generalizations are possible 
regarding the nature of the Chinese agricultural property regime.  
On the one hand, these formal use rights fall short of the full 
bundle of rights which most formalists advocate.  For example, 
although farmers have options regarding the cultivation of their 
land, they are not permitted to convert the land to non-agricultural 
use; this may impede the realization of certain potential efficiency 
gains.  Furthermore, the mortgaging of farmland continues to be 
prohibited, thereby constraining the supply of rural credit.118 
On the other hand, these use rights seem to provide many of 
the protections that are associated with formal private property 
rights regimes.  Most importantly, subject to the conditions above 
as well as certain implicit and explicit taxes, use rights are intended 
to be relatively secure.  Land markets are also theoretically 
facilitated by these use rights, as they are transferable in a variety 
of ways, including inheritance and lease.119  Land transfers within 
the collective were formally permitted by the 1986 Land 
Administration Law, and in 1998 amendments to the Land 
Administration Law allowed for contracting of the land to those 
outside the collective, provided a sufficient proportion of the 
collective consented.120  Thus, even if formal ownership rests in the 
collective, the legal framework of use rights seemingly provides 
sufficiently strong claims to individuals to yield many of the 
advantages of private property discussed above by the formalists. 
There are, however, four reasons why even the formal use 
rights held by rural Chinese would fail in practice to provide many 
of the posited benefits of private property.  First, administrative 
redistribution of land by the village leadership is common, leading 
to decreased tenure security.  A 2005 survey found that 74.3 
percent of villages had conducted at least one land redistribution 
since the implementation of the HRS, while 55.0 percent of villages 
had experienced two or more readjustments.121  This occurs most 
 
117 Charles Krusekopf, Diversity in Land Tenure Arrangements Under the 
Household Responsibility System in China, 13 CHINA ECON. REV. 297, 298–301 (2002). 
118 ECONOMIST, supra note 115. 
119 Weiguo Wang, Land Use Rights: Legal Perspectives and Pitfalls for Land 
Reform, in DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
CHINA 62 (Peter Ho ed., 2005). 
120 Land Administration Law, supra note 113, art. 15; Ho & Lin, supra note 
110. 
121 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 775. 
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often in response to demographic changes, such as changes in 
household size or labor supply.122  Although the central 
government has issued directives against such redistribution and 
occurrences of such redistribution have been decreasing, it remains 
widespread.123  This may be the result of a continued perception by 
many of land as a communal resource.124  Thus, given the 
significant deviation between formal law and informal norms, it is 
possible that the latter has undermined the former. 
Second, especially in rural areas near towns and cities, there is 
a significant risk of expropriation of rural land for development, 
also decreasing tenure security.  The Chinese constitution 
specifically allows the state to expropriate collective land—a power 
that local officials have seemed to exercise with some frequency.125  
Keliang et al. find that the number of expropriations of rural 
farmland increased fifteen-fold between 1995 and 2005.126  
Moreover, this expropriation often occurs without real 
consultation, and the compensation provided is significantly less 
than either the market value of the land or the amount needed to 
compensate farmers for the loss of their livelihoods.127  Even this 
meager compensation is sometimes not provided.  Keliang et al., 
for example, find that only two-thirds of farmers actually received 
compensation that was promised to them in return for 
expropriation.128 
Third, while land transfers are formally permissible, there 
continue to be barriers to the development of an active market for 
land.  These include cultural taboos related to the commoditization 
 
122 Loren Brandt et al., Land Rights in China: Facts, Fictions and Issues, 47 CHINA 
J. 67, 70 (2002). 
123 Wang, supra note 119.  Indeed, Krusekopf suggests that the village leader, 
rather than the central government, is the ultimate determiner of land relations in 
a given village.  Krusekopf, supra note 117. 
124 James Kung, Choice of Land Tenure in China: The Case of a County with Quasi-
Private Property Rights, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 793, 794 (2002). 
125 Prior to 2004, the Chinese constitution permitted expropriation without 
compensation.  Amendments introduced in 2004 require the payment of 
compensation for any land expropriated or requisitioned.  Compare XIAN FA art. 10 
(1982) (P.R.C.) with XIAN FA art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.) (demonstrating the changes 
made to the constitution regarding land expropriation and related compensation); 
Ho & Lin, supra note 110. 
126 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 780. 
127 Xiaolin Guo, Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China, 166 CHINA Q. 
422, 423 (2001). 
128 Keliang, supra note 114, at 782. 
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of land, the perception of the need for land as a form of social 
insurance, and, in some areas, local prohibitions on the transfer of 
land, despite its formal legality at the national level. 
Finally, and more generally, rural peasants are generally 
unable to access the legal system to enforce their rights.  The court 
system is largely out of reach of rural farmers, and in many cases 
no written contracts or certificates were issued to farmers detailing 
their entitlements to the use of a certain plot of land.129  Keliang et 
al. find that, as of 2005, 36.8 percent of households had neither a 
contract nor a certificate which provided written evidence of their 
land rights.130  Potentially more disturbing is the poor quality of 
these documents: only 10.4 percent of farmers possessed either a 
contract or certificate which fully outlined their rights and 
contained all the contractual provisions required by the legislative 
and regulatory framework.131  As a result, there is often a 
significant divergence between the formal rights and entitlements 
of farmers and the treatment they receive from local officials. 
While the transition from communal agricultural production to 
the HRS brought significant growth in grain production, scholars 
supporting a formal property rights regime predict that such 
growth would be limited by continuing tenure insecurity.  
Although grain production rose dramatically in the early 1980s—
this growth being largely attributed to the incentives that were 
created by allowing farmers to internalize the benefits of increased 
yields—growth began to slow in the mid-1980s; from 1985 to 1994, 
grain output increased only 0.9 percent annually.132  Some scholars 
have sought to explain the slowdown in the growth of grain in the 
mid-1980s by arguing that the efficiency gains resulting from 
partial privatization and increased labor input had been exhausted 
and that further growth would require increased physical inputs to 
agricultural production.133  Thus, while the internalization of 
benefits associated with increased investment in labor and other 
 
129 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 483 
(2002); see also id. ch. 7 (outlining general commentary on the inadequacies of the 
judiciary). 
130 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 788. 
131 Id. at 789. 
132 Brandt et al., supra note 122, at 68. 
133 Gershon Feder et al., The Determinants of Farm Investment and Residential 
Construction in Post-Reform China, 41 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 1–2 
(1992). 
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inputs had increased production to a point, further production 
increases would require additional investment.  They predicted 
that tenure insecurity would dissuade farmers from making such 
investments, especially those investments which had a relatively 
long time-horizon. 
Such analysis is challenged by some authors, however, who 
contend that agricultural production continued to be strong 
despite weak property rights.  These authors suggest that 
agricultural growth remained strong through the 1980s, with the 
stagnation in grain output largely caused by farmers switching 
away from grain in favor of higher-valued crops.134  Moreover, in 
the late 1990s, the rate of growth of grain production began to 
accelerate again, and agricultural output has seen substantial 
growth in recent years; this is consistent with the above reasoning, 
as the government relaxed its price controls on grain in the early 
1990s, thereby increasing the incentives for farmers to produce it.135  
Indeed, rural economic growth throughout this period seems to 
have been strong, with one author noting that real per capita net 
income of rural residents rose by 63 percent between 1985 and 
1997.136  Because of this seemingly unusual growth in the presence 
of weak property rights, it is essential to examine the empirical 
research which has been undertaken to determine what the 
relationship is between security of tenure and agricultural growth 
in the Chinese context. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical record linking 
agricultural output and security of tenure in China is mixed.  On 
the one hand, much of the empirical work has shown a linkage 
between increased investment and stronger perceptions of tenure 
security.  Li, Rozelle, and Brandt, using the length of time which a 
farmer has occupied a plot of land as a proxy for tenure security, 
found that increased tenure security increases incentives for long-
term land-saving investments, though not for short-term 
investments.137  Deininger and Jin reach a similar result in 
 
134 David K. Lambert & Elliot Parker, Productivity in Chinese Provincial 
Agriculture, 49 J. AGRIC. ECON. 1, 16 (1998). 
135 Id. 
136 Jean C. Oi, Two Decades of Rural Reform in China, 159 CHINA Q. 616, 616 
(1999). 
137 Guo Li et al., Tenure, Land Rights, and Farmer Investment Incentives in China, 
19 AGRIC. ECON. 63, 65 (1998); see also Hanan Jacoby et al., Hazards of Expropriation: 
Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1420, 1421–22 
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comparing Guizhou, a Chinese province which adopted a policy of 
not redistributing land in response to demographic changes, with 
other provinces which otherwise shared many similar 
characteristics.138  Hu has similarly argued that the short time 
horizons provided by the current land tenure system have led to 
the presence of short-term resource mining and environmental 
degradation.139  While none of these studies could address the 
impact of formal title to land, they do indicate that increased 
perceptions of security led to greater investment.  The logical 
conclusion of these arguments is that the increased security 
provided by formal title would bring even greater benefits in terms 
of investment, long-term planning, and resource management.  
Indeed, Keliang et al. lend support to this thesis, finding that 
households that had been issued contracts or certificates were 
significantly more likely to undertake investments than those that 
had not been issued contracts or certificates.140 
While most empirical work has shown a strong linkage 
between tenure security and investment, some studies have found 
a rather limited connection between the degree of tenure security 
and investment.  For example, Feder et al. find no statistically 
significant relationship between tenure security and investment in 
farm-related capital, with tenure security being measured by 
farmers’ assessment of the probabilities of a) the re-allocation of 
land during the contractual period, and b) receiving the same plot 
of land when the contract is renewed.141  Interestingly, Feder et al. 
also find mixed results relating to access to credit.  They find that 
in certain areas, where there are constraints on the availability of 
certain inputs, the lack of access to credit is not a significant 
constraint on investment.142  Where inputs to production are 
available, however, greater access to credit would increase farm 
investment.  Similarly, Guo Li, in a 1999 unpublished PhD 
dissertation, provides a comprehensive overview of land rights 
 
(2002) (supporting the assertion that increased tenure security increases the 
incentives for long-term investments). 
138 Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, The Impact of Property Rights on 
Households’ Investment, Risk Coping, and Policy Preferences: Evidence from China, 51 
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 851, 852 (2003). 
139 Wei Hu, Household Land Tenure Reform in China: Its Impact on Farming Land 
Use and Agro-Environment, 14 LAND USE POL. 175, 179 (1997). 
140 Keliang et al., supra note 114, at 812–13 tbls. 15–16. 
141 Feder et al., supra note 133, at 22–23. 
142 Id at 22. 
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and their effects on investment in China in which he concludes that 
while tenure security does increase the use of inputs and 
production, the efficiency loss from less tenure security is not 
large.143 
These results suggest generally that although there might be 
some efficiency loss from the lack of formal title, this efficiency loss 
is not too large.  This in turn suggests that the investment 
incentives, which the formalists posit would arise from more 
secure formal title, are limited.  The question then arises as to why 
there is already a strong degree of agricultural investment in China 
without formal title.  As Clarke points out, and as acknowledged 
by many of the informalist scholars discussed above, it may be that 
predictability and expectations, rather than formal rights per se, 
are the most important determinants of investment and growth.144  
He suggests that this explains the difference between Township 
and Village Enterprises (TVEs), which despite their lack of formal 
rights face limited risk of expropriation and have grown even more 
quickly than grain output, and the agricultural sector, where the 
risk of expropriation has historically been somewhat higher.145  
This type of reasoning has parallels in the agricultural sector, as a 
key determinant of agricultural investment may not be formal 
rights, but rather farmers’ perception of predictability and 
continued access to a given plot of land.  Indeed, this same 
reasoning may explain the early growth in agricultural 
productivity despite somewhat unclear and insecure rights; despite 
unclear formal legal entitlements, there is evidence that a majority 
of farmers felt that their tenure was relatively secure.146  The above 
reasoning also suggests, however, that agricultural growth might 
have been even stronger if farmers had held even greater levels of 
tenure security. 
 
143 Guo Li, The Economics of Land Tenure and Property Rights in China’s 
Agricultural Sector (Mar. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford 
University) (on file with author). 
144 Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The 
China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 97–100 (2003). 
145 Id. at 100–07. 
146 James Kai-sing Kung & Shouying Lui, Farmers’ Preferences Regarding 
Ownership and Land Tenure in Post-Mao China: Unexpected Evidence from Eight 
Counties, 38 CHINA J. 33, 50–51 (1997) (finding that, with the exception of two 
countires, 61.9 percent of farmers were confident their plots would not be 
redrawn prior to their contracts’ expiration). 
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This type of predictability is often attributed to the strong social 
norms, the importance of relationships (guanxi), and the corporatist 
ethic present in rural China.147  It may be that strong social 
relationships have operated as a substitute for the rule of law in 
China; thus, within close-knit communities, the ongoing 
relationships between villagers and the local government and 
among the villagers themselves might provide a sufficient basis for 
tenure security.  Indeed, a significant level of social trust between 
the local government and villagers would be consistent with the 
observation that a significant number of villagers support 
occasional land redistributions. 
While tenure security has been a major source of debate in 
Chinese land policy, the issue of the development of land markets 
has also attracted attention.  Land markets continue to be rather 
underdeveloped, and many villages continue to prohibit land 
transfers, despite laws to the contrary.148  While some informalists 
have claimed that administrative reallocations of land are 
necessary to ensure equity, Deininger and Jin have shown how 
land rental markets are actually better than administrative 
solutions in terms of both efficiency and equity considerations.149  
In another paper, Deininger and Jin also find that the ability to 
transfer land significantly increased long-term agricultural 
investment.150  In comparing market and administrative land 
allocation mechanisms, Carter and Yao find that equity concerns 
trump efficiency considerations in administrative allocation.  This 
means that, over time, administrative reallocations could lead to 
significant inefficiencies in land use.151 
 
147 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 470. 
148 Krusekopf, supra note 117, at 305–07. 
149 Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, Land Rental Markets as an Alternative to 
Reallocation? Equity and Efficiency Considerations in the Chinese Land Tenure System 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2930, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636292. 
150 Deininger & Jin, supra note 138, at 864, 877. 
151 Michael Carter & Yang Yao, Market Versus Administrative Reallocation of 
Land: An Econometric Analysis, in DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 151, 162–64 (Peter Ho ed., 2005). 
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2.1.5.2. Housing in Urban China 
The legal framework regulating urban housing in China has 
been in a state of considerable flux in recent years.152  While private 
housing predominated prior to 1949, the newly-established 
Communist government sought to gradually replace private 
housing with public housing.  Thus, in 1957, the government 
introduced the danwei (work-unit) system, under which most 
housing was provided by individuals’ work-units.153  Various 
levels of government also took steps over this period to bring much 
of the privately-owned housing into the public sphere.154  Thus, 
over this period, housing was generally conceived of as a welfare 
benefit provided by one’s employer or the state rather than as a 
tradable commodity.  Over time, this led to significant 
inefficiencies.  As rents were nominal, there was virtually no 
private investment in housing, and the danwei system was not able 
to provide a sufficient amount of housing for urban dwellers.  Over 
time, this led to drastic housing shortages; one government 
estimate found a shortage of one billion square meters of housing 
 
152 This section can only provide a brief overview of Chinese urban land law 
and policy.  For additional materials that discuss these issues in much greater 
depth, see Qingshu Xie et al., The Emergence of the Urban Land Market in China: 
Evolution, Structure, Constraints and Perspectives, 39 URB. STUD. 1375 (2002). 
153 Yan Song et al., Housing Policy in the People’s Republic of China: An Historical 
Review, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA 163, 164–68 (Chengri 
Ding & Yan Song eds., 2005). 
154 Id.; see also Yingshun Zhao & Steven C. Bourassa, China’s Urban Housing 
Reform: Recent Achievements and New Inequities, 18 HOUSING STUD. 721, 728–29 
(2003) (discussing the steps taken by the Jinin government to force private 
homeowners to effectively turn their land over to the state).  While the work-unit 
and the state played increasingly dominant roles in housing allocation over this 
period, it would be incorrect to say that private housing completely disappeared.  
Id. at 725.  However, as Wilhelm points out, China had no formal property law 
until 1986.  Thus, while there was some type of arrangement which resembled 
private property during this period, it existed very much in a grey area of the law.  
Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 227, 239 (2004) (defining private property rights at the time as being 
governed by “customary norms as demonstrated by actual practice” rather than 
by law). 
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in 1978.155  Moreover, because housing was tied to the work-unit, 
population and labor mobility was significantly constrained.156 
The transition towards a more market-based economy that 
began in 1978 resulted in increased recognition and legal 
protection of private property rights in urban housing.  This has 
not meant entirely abandoning non-price mechanisms of housing 
allocation, such as employer-provided housing or other 
administrative allocation mechanisms; by contrast, such 
mechanisms have continued to play a significant role in providing 
housing.157  However, it has meant allowing the development of a 
private housing market through legal reforms designed to clarify 
and strengthen property rights.  The major legislation enabling the 
development of a private land market was the 1988 Land 
Administration Law, which specified that use rights to state-owned 
land, such as urban land, could be allocated to individuals or 
units.158  A 1990 regulation set the lengths of these use rights and 
 
155 Song et al., supra note 153, at 168–69.  In addition to housing shortages, the 
administrative allocation of land led to significant distortions in land use more 
generally, including large amounts of unused land and an unnecessarily high 
proportion of industrial land.  On this point, see Chengri Ding, Land Policy Reform 
in China: An Assessment and Prospects, 20 LAND USE POL’Y 109 (2003). 
156 Song et al., supra note 153, at 168. 
157 See Ya Ping Wang & Alan Murie, Commercial Housing Development in Urban 
China, 36 URB. STUD. 1475, 1485–87 (1999) (emphasizing that there has been 
significant variation among regions and economic classes in terms of market-
based versus administrative allocations of land).  For a detailed overview of this 
two-track system as well as resulting inefficiencies, see Anthony Gar-On Yeh, The 
Dual Land Market and Urban Development in China, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING 
MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 153, at 163, 165–68.  See also Xing Quan Zhang, 
Urban Land Reform in China, 14 LAND USE POL’Y 187, 193–94 (1997) (offering 
additional overview on the two-track system); Youqin Huang & William A. V. 
Clark, Housing Tenure Choice in Transitional China: A Multilevel Analysis, 39 URB. 
STUD. 7 (2002) (analyzing various institutional and socioeconomic causes of 
inequalities in the two-track system). 
158 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988) art. 7, LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.).  This Law was amended in 1998 and again in 2004.  
See Land Administration Law, 1998, supra note 113 (amending the Land 
Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China, previously revised at the 
11th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress 
on August 28, 2004).  Since 1982, the Chinese Constitution has provided that land 
in cities is owned by the state.  XIAN FA art. 10 (1982).  Thus, only use rights, rather 
than the actual ownership of the land itself, are allocated to individuals under the 
Land Administration Law. 
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also specified that these rights could in certain cases be transferred 
or mortgaged.159 
However, despite increased formal recognition of housing 
rights in urban areas, many of the same sources of tenure 
insecurity in rural farmland have similarly caused unsecure or 
unclear property rights in urban areas.  For example, significant 
tenure insecurity—as well as the actual dislocation of millions of 
individuals—has resulted from the fact that, under Chinese law, 
there are very few barriers preventing the state from expropriating 
land for construction or redevelopment.160  While the law requires 
compensation for such expropriations, the local authorities that 
determine the appropriate measure of compensation for 
expropriation have generally provided compensation that falls 
below the replacement cost of the property.161  Moreover, even to 
the extent that individuals have legally-protected property rights, 
individuals have often had significant difficulties asserting those 
rights, as judges—who are typically financially beholden to local 
authorities—have been reluctant to challenge decisions of local 
governments.162 
The 2007 Property Law may rectify some of these problems and 
strengthen urban dwellers’ property rights, as it significantly 
clarifies a variety of aspects of land use rights including, perhaps 
most importantly, the types of compensation that are owed to 
 
159 Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right 
to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban Areas (promulgated by the State 
Council of the PRC, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990) arts. 4, 12 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.).  Later regulations further 
clarified the transferability of use rights. See Provisional Rules on Administration 
of Allocated Land Use Right (promulgated by the State Land Administration, 
Mar. 8, 1992, effective Mar. 8, 1992) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) 
(P.R.C.).  For a more detailed overview of provisions of the Land Administration 
Law as well as its problems and subsequent amendments, see William Valletta, 
The Land Administration Law of 1998 and Its Impact on Urban Development, in 
EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 153, at 59. 
160 See generally Wilhelm, supra note 154 (detailing the process by which the 
state expropriates land from landowners).  See also Land Administration Law, 
1998, supra note 113, at art. 58; Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation 
Management Regulations (promulgated by the PRC State Council, June 6, 2001, 
effective Nov. 1, 2001) available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad 
/index.phpd?showsingle=2335 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
161 See Wilhelm, supra note 154, at 249 (noting that local governments have 
wide discretion in determining compensation). 
162 Id. at 236. 
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those individuals whose property is requisitioned.163  However, it 
remains to be seen whether this law will meaningfully strengthen 
individuals’ security of tenure, as it appears that the principal 
source of tenure insecurity is not the lack of legal rights but rather 
the unenforceability of those rights. 
From an economic development perspective, the formalization 
of property rights measures appears to have had mixed success.  
On the one hand, the use rights created by the 1988 law and 
clarified by subsequent legislation and regulations have appeared 
to generate a significant real estate boom and spur housing 
development.164  However, because of remaining uncertainty in 
property rights, as well the significant role still played by 
administrative actors in allocating urban housing, significant 
distortions remain in the urban housing market, including both 
high vacancy rates as well as over-inflated housing prices.165 
2.1.5.3. The Growth of Chinese Businesses 
Since the gradual move towards marketization began in 1978, 
the growth of business in China has been dramatic.  In the 1980s, 
private enterprise was still viewed with suspicion by the state, and 
the legal framework was exceptionally inhospitable to private 
enterprise.166  The primary source of business growth during this 
period was from organizations such as TVEs, which included 
aspects of both public and private ownership, with some growth 
also coming from household businesses and other cooperative 
forms.167  TVEs were the most important source of economic 
growth, and the Chinese state sought to encourage their 
development by providing them with favorable tax treatment and 
extending significant loans.168  In practice such organizations often 
 
163 Property Law, supra note 115, art. 42. 
164 Wilhelm, supra note 154, at 243–47; Xing Quan Zhang, Development of the 
Chinese Housing Market, in EMERGING LAND & HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra 
note 153, at 183, 185–89. 
165 Zhang, supra note 164, at 189–94; see also Jieming Zhu, A Transitional 
Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China, 42 URB. STUD. 1369 (2005) 
(discussing the evolution of property rights over state-owned urban land). 
166 Vai Io Lo & Xiaowen Tian, Property Rights, Productivity Gains and Economic 
Growth: The Chinese Experience, 14 POST-COMMUNIST ECONS. 245, 246–48 (2002). 
167 YANLAI WANG, CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
152–55 (2003). 
168 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 246–47. 
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operated as private firms, but they formally maintained the 
structure of a TVE because of the accompanying benefits.169 
In 1988 private enterprises were provided with some degree of 
legal recognition and protection.  The constitution was amended in 
April 1988 to permit the existence of the private sector and to 
guarantee its rights.170  This was followed shortly thereafter by 
provisional regulations of private enterprises.  These regulations 
formally provided some degree of protection for private 
businesses’ property rights, specifying that private enterprises had 
the right to own and transfer property.171 
These initial moves were followed by further legal protections 
in the 1990s.  Forms of business organizations were clarified with 
enactments of the first Company Law in 1993 and the Partnership 
Law in 1997.172  This was followed in 1999 by a constitutional 
amendment that further strengthened the property rights of 
individuals and private enterprises.173  Over the period during 
which these changes were occurring, the private sector’s share of 
industrial output grew dramatically from 8 percent in 1988 to 38 
percent in 1998.174  Moreover, foreign investment in China has also 
increased dramatically since greater legal protections were 
implemented.175 
Despite a more hospitable legal framework than was present in 
the 1980s, the protection of property rights has remained far from 
perfect for Chinese businesses for a number of reasons, many of 
 
169 Id. 
170 XIAN FA art. 11 (1988) (P.R.C.); WANG, supra note 167, at 156. 
171 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 249. 
172 Id.  See Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2008) (P.R.C.); Partnership Business Law (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 23, 1997, effective Aug. 1, 1997) LAWINFOCHINA 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
173 XIAN FA art. 11 (1999) (P.R.C.); Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 249. 
174 Lo & Tian, supra note 166, at 250.  Despite this significant growth in 
private enterprise, state-owned enterprises continue to play a significant role in 
the Chinese economy.  For an overview of the important role of state-owned 
enterprises in the Chinese economy as well as some of the problems of this 
arrangement, see Harry G. Broadman, The Business(es) of the Chinese State, 24 
WORLD ECON. 849 (2001).  For a paper exploring the superior economic 
performance of TVEs relative to state-owned enterprises, see Yusheng Peng, 
Chinese Villages and Townships as Industrial Corporations: Ownership, Governance, and 
Market Discipline, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1338 (2001). 
175 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 463–64. 
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which have been noted above.  Since local governments tend to be 
selective and self-interested in enforcing laws and regulations, the 
enforcement of laws and the effective degree of protection of 
property rights is much weaker than the legal framework would 
suggest.176  Moreover, the lack of an unbiased and effective 
judiciary has rendered many businesses unable to enforce their 
rights.177  Finally, the predatory tendencies of various levels of 
government have meant that businesses have been pressured or 
otherwise forced to give up their assets to the state.178  Thus, as 
Peerenboom concludes, “China’s legal system undeniably still falls 
far short of any reasonable standards for rule of law,” and there are 
still significant risks facing firms operating in China.179  The 
question that then arises is how such dramatic economic growth 
was possible without the security and clarity of formal property 
rights. 
One explanation offered for such remarkable economic growth 
in the absence of strong formal property rights is the presence of 
relational networks and guanxi, which substitute for formal 
property rights regimes.  For example, Weitzman and Xu argue 
that the economic success of TVEs is best explained by the high 
levels of trust among villagers in rural China, which allows 
villagers to successfully run cooperative firms despite 
exceptionally unclear property rights underlying such 
organizations.180  Consistent with the informalist literature 
discussed above, it may be that tight social networks and the 
repeated-game nature of villager participation in TVEs have 
allowed such organizations to flourish.  However, while TVEs 
generally have experienced significant economic success, some 
authors have argued that economic performance would have been 
 
176 David Wank, Producing Property Rights: Strategies, Networks, and Efficiency 
in Urban China’s Nonstate Firms, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN 
CHINA 248, 251 (Jean Oi & Andrew Walder eds., 1999). 
177 Id.; PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 463–64. 
178 Wank, supra note 176. 
179 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 464. 
180 Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township-Village Enterprises 
as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 136–41 (1994).  For a paper 
which fleshes out Weitzman & Xu’s analysis, see Xiaolin Pei, Township-Village 
Enterprises, Local Governments and Rural Communities: The Chinese Village as a Firm 
During Economic Transition, 4 ECON. TRANSITION 43 (1996). 
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even stronger under better defined property rights,181 thus 
suggesting that there may be limits to the economic growth 
possible under unclear property rights. 
Corporatist relationships between firms and various levels of 
government and influential individuals have also played a key role 
in the growth of Chinese firms.182  Even prior to the formal 
legalization of private enterprises in 1988, quasi-private enterprises 
were created under the guise of collective or co-operative 
enterprises with local governments.183  Che and Qian argue that in 
the face of a predatory state, such linkages between firms and local 
government can be beneficial for both parties.  By operating within 
the governmental framework, the firm has greater security from 
expropriation or seizure of its assets and profits, and costly 
revenue hiding will decrease.  Similarly, the government benefits 
because such enterprises often make significant contributions to 
public goods such as the provision of infrastructure.184  Similarly, 
in his examination of TVE’s, Li asserts that where the regulatory 
environment is unclear and the government might try to block 
certain transactions, ambiguous property rights might actually be 
more efficient than private property rights.185  Li argues that this is 
the case because firms can gain political influence and help with 
regulatory issues through fuzzy connections and a corporatist 
arrangement with the local government.  The government, on the 
other hand, can use the TVE as a mechanism for achieving certain 
policy goals, such as curbing unemployment.186  This suggests that 
TVE’s nebulous ownership structure may actually provide greater 
opportunities for growth than would strictly private firms. 
The strength of informal relationships in China may also 
explain certain aspects of the finance and governance of private 
Chinese firms.  For example, Allen, et al. note that publicly listed 
 
181 See e.g., Chun Chang et al., Incentive Contracting Versus Ownership Reforms: 
Evidence From China’s Township and Village Enterprises, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 414, 426 
(2003) (concluding that “changing from collecting ownership to stock-based 
ownership can bring about significant efficiency gains during the transition 
period when market-supporting institutions are developing”). 
182 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 430; WANK, supra note 176. 
183 WANG, supra note 167, at 152–53. 
184 Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government 
Ownership of Firms, 113 Q. J. ECON. 467 (1998). 
185 David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: 
The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1 (1996). 
186 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 486–87. 
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companies perform much worse than privately held companies.  
They explain the poor performance of the former through weak 
securities regulation and ineffective corporate governance, while 
they explain the stronger performance of the latter by citing strong 
personal relationships which allow companies to raise money 
easily through informal credit markets and which constrain 
opportunistic corporate governance.187  This explanation accords 
with the informalist literature examined above, as cooperative 
relationships are obviously easier to sustain in the tight-knit 
context of a family firm or small business than they are in the 
detached environment of public corporations.188  Similarly, some 
authors have argued that relational networks explain the 
significant amount of foreign direct investment which has flowed 
into China despite the absence of strong formal institutions.189 
While guanxi and corporatist linkages may provide some 
degree of property protection in an insecure environment, they 
also have a number of drawbacks which may ultimately slow the 
growth of business.190  First, in some cases, otherwise inefficient 
firms may survive because of local government support, thereby 
straining government resources and allowing inefficient firms to 
survive.191  Second, the integration of businesses with political 
entities means that the success of a business may be more 
dependent on an individual’s political connections than on the true 
profitability of the enterprise.192  Third, property protections based 
on such connections may present opportunities for corruption and 
rent-seeking.193  Fourth, extensive reliance on such linkages may 
undermine efforts at promoting the rule of law in the long term.194  
 
187 Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China, 77 J. FIN. 
ECON. 57 (2005). 
188 This position is also consistent with, though not identical to, Burkart, et 
al.’s argument that where protections for minority investors are weak, firms will 
be owned and managed by the same individuals; i.e. family firms will be the 
norm.  See Mike Burkart et al., Family Firms, 58 J. FIN. 2167 (2003). 
189 See e.g., Hongying Wang, Informal Institutions and Foreign Investment in 
China, 13 PAC. REV. 525 (2000). 
190 See generally MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF 
DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 180–81 (2006) (warning that the lack of reform 
measures encourages, among other severe economic consequences, bad loans 
which threaten the country’s entire financial sector). 
191 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 470–71. 
192 Wank, supra note 176, at 262. 
193 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 472. 
194 Id. 
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Finally, personal relationships simply might not provide 
sufficiently strong protection of property rights in many cases.  
Thus, although corporatist arrangements can substitute for formal 
property rights to some extent, they can create substantial social 
costs which could be avoided by a strong formal property rights 
regime. 
2.2. The Costs of a Formal Property Rights Regime 
2.2.1. Monetary Cost 
While the formalists may be correct about the efficiency gains 
which arise from formal property rights, some scholars contend 
that those efficiency gains may, in some circumstances, be 
outweighed by the costs of creating and enforcing the property 
rights regime.  As Demsetz pointed out, the costs of creating and 
maintaining a formal property rights regime can outweigh the 
benefits arising from the regime, especially in cases where land is 
relatively abundant.195  Anderson and Hill similarly note that 
“[e]stablishing and protecting property rights is very much a 
productive activity toward which resources can be devoted.  But, 
like any other activity, the amount of this investment will depend 
on the marginal benefits and costs to investors of allocating 
resources to these endeavors.”196 
With respect to creating a formal regime, there are a variety of 
initial costs, including surveying land, creating a title registry, 
adjudicating conflicting claims, etc.  As Banner points out, the 
transaction costs associated with valuing and allocating rights can 
be extremely high in the transition from one property rights regime 
to another.197  In a survey of various papers which attempt to 
quantify the direct costs of creating land registration systems, 
Hanstad notes that land registration has been in some cases as 
expensive as $240 per parcel.198  Moreover, there may be additional 
indirect costs in educating people about the benefits and mechanics 
 
195 Demsetz, supra note 11, at 350–53. 
196 Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of 
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975). 
197 Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 
364–65 (2002). 
198 Hanstad, supra note 27, at 664–65. 
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of titling, without which the informal system may continue to 
prevail. 
Once the regime is created, there are ongoing costs required to 
maintain it.  While land registries, either in the form of deed 
recording systems or title registries,199 provide the greatest degree 
of security and clarity, they also require continual updating and 
maintenance, thereby creating a number of ongoing costs.  These 
costs can often outweigh the benefits supposedly derived from 
formal property rights. 
The costs may also differ depending on the nature of the 
property in question.  As Baland and Platteau note, the relative 
costs of maintaining and enforcing a property regime increase as 
the physical space which that resource occupies increases.200  This 
suggests that especially in areas where land is used extensively 
rather than intensively—such as grazing land for animals—the 
costs of enforcing private property rights may be high relative to 
the benefits. 
2.2.2. Social Insurance and Equity 
Where communal land has traditionally played a role as a 
collective insurance mechanism, the titling of that land might 
eliminate that mechanism while not replacing it with anything 
else.201  Richard Posner examines a number of insurance 
mechanisms in traditional societies and argues that traditional 
institutions, such as communal land or frequently redistributed 
land, can be efficient in some circumstances.202  Baland and 
Francois formally model the insurance function of communal land 
and show that where there exist incomplete insurance markets 
 
199 Hanstad, supra note 27, at 650–51. 
200 Jean-Marie Baland & Jean-Philippe Platteau, Division of the Commons: A 
Partial Assessment of the New Institutional Economics of Land Rights, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 644, 645 (1998). 
201 Rohini Pande & Christopher Udry, Institutions and Development: A View 
from Below 25–30 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 928, 1999), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=864044; Michael 
J. Trebilcock, Communal Property Rights: The Papua New Guinean Experience, 34 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 377 (1984). For a discussion of some of the geographical conditions 
under which the communal property arrangements are efficient, see Jeffrey B. 
Nugent & Nicolas Sanchez, Common Property Rights as an Endogenous Response to 
Risk, 80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 651 (1998). 
202 Richard Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 
23 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1980). 
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because of either information asymmetries or limits on contract 
enforcement—two very plausible conditions in many developing 
countries—if individuals are sufficiently risk averse and the 
efficiency gains from privatization are sufficiently limited, 
privatization of communal land can be welfare-decreasing.203  By 
contrast, Platteau argues that population pressures will naturally 
lead to the erosion of this insurance function,204 but he also 
acknowledges that the individualization of land tenure rights can 
be a separate force which leads to this outcome.205 
Related to this problem is the emergence of a landless class, 
which is much less likely where land is redistributed.206  André and 
Platteau show how mounting population pressures and the 
development of informal land markets in Rwanda led to distress 
sales and the growth of a landless class.207 
This issue has been studied in the Chinese context, where a 
body of literature suggests that some Chinese farmers actually 
seem to prefer periodic redistribution because of the social 
insurance function which such redistribution plays.  For example, 
Kung and Liu claim that almost two-thirds of the farmers they 
surveyed were opposed to stable tenure in the form of thirty-year 
land contracts.208 
Interestingly, Deininger and Jin have documented a type of 
learning effect, as households in an area which exogenously 
introduced greater tenure security were, ceteris paribus, generally 
more in favor of tenure security than those elsewhere.209  Kung 
examined the village of Meitan in Guizhou province, the same 
province that Deininger and Jin studied, and actually found a 
 
203 Jean-Marie Baland & Patrick Francois, Commons as Insurance and the 
Welfare Impact of Privatization, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (2005); see also DEININGER, supra 
note 5, at 29–30 (arguing that local communities can provide some insurance value 
because unlike centralized bureaucracies, they have better access to private 
information). 
204 For a discussion of this point in Rwanda, see André & Platteau, supra note 
78. 
205 Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Gradual Erosion of the Social Security Function of 
Customary Land Tenure Arrangements in Lineage-Based Societies 26 (World Inst. for 
Dev. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 2002/26, 2002), available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/plj01/plj01.pdf. 
206 Platteau, supra note 22, at 65–69; Deininger & Feder, supra note 18, at 2–3; 
Hanstad, supra note 27. 
207 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 24–29. 
208 Kung & Liu, supra note 146, at 54. 
209 Deininger & Jin, supra note 138, at 864. 
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contrary result, finding that the introduction of more secure tenure 
had actually caused some in Meitan to oppose tenure security in 
favor of periodic reallocations.210  Not surprisingly, those who 
continued to favor tenure security were those that had benefited 
from it, i.e., older families who had previously been assigned large 
amounts of land. 
2.2.3. Undermining Informal Mechanisms of Tenure Security 
In undertaking a cost-benefit analysis of a formal property 
rights regime, it is important to take into account the effect that 
formalization has on informal norms.  In certain situations, the 
institutionalization of new formal norms can damage or disrupt 
informal norms.  A theoretical account of this is given by Pildes, 
who notes that state action can undermine norms through three 
broad processes:  by destroying the social conditions that enable 
reciprocity; through direct attacks on the norms of reciprocity; and, 
with failures by the state to appreciate the broad context in which 
norms emerge.211  Similarly, Kahan shows how governmental 
incentive schemes can be seen as a social cue that individuals are 
not inclined to cooperate voluntarily, and legislation can actually 
weaken social norms.212 
Applied to the context of property, these theories suggest that 
the formalization of title may potentially undermine norms of 
voluntary respect and cooperation for tenure security, thereby 
leading to less secure property rights.  This is especially true if 
there are substantial transaction costs for the individuals seeking to 
enforce them.  Moreover, as Lanjouw and Levy note, “if one takes 
an area with a long-standing and well-understood customary 
property rights system and overlays a formal state titling program, 
it can make residents less secure because they are unsure which 
system will apply in any given situation.”213  For example, 
Besteman notes that customary land tenure in Somalia was quite 
 
210 Kung, supra note 124, at 798 (noting that surveys indicated a three-fold 
increase—from 16 percent to 48 percent of those surveyed—in those preferring 
land reassignment to stable land tenure during this period). 
211 Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2055, 2067–73 (1996). 
212 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 71, 76 (2003). 
213 Jean O. Lanjouw & Philip Levy, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit 
Framework for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 889, 905 (2004). 
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secure and that titling programs actually decreased security by 
calling into question the applicability of customary law and by 
creating the possibility of dispossession of unregistered farmers 
who continued to abide by customary law.214  There is also some 
evidence which suggests that land held under customary tenure 
may be less prone to land conflicts than land held under newer 
alternative forms of tenure, because the former is viewed as more 
legitimate than the latter.215  Cases have also been noted where the 
formalization of property rights has undermined traditional 
resource management arrangements.  For example, Jodha has 
documented how changes in village governance structures in parts 
of India and the privatization of certain plots of land have 
undermined traditional arrangements for the efficient management 
of common property resources.216 
A related problem in the property context is that the 
formalization of individual property rights may erode the rich and 
often disaggregated bundles of customary entitlements to land.  As 
Banner notes, while in contemporary developed countries land is 
primarily allocated on a spatial basis, there have been, and 
continue to be, numerous property rights regimes where property 
rights are allocated on a functional basis.217  Because customary 
practices often provide different owners with different rights to the 
same land—such as the right to grow cash crops, the right to graze 
cattle, the right to gather firewood, the right to use streams on the 
land for water, the right to traverse, etc.—the creation of exclusive 
individual rights can undermine traditional activities which 
depended on this (by Ellickson’s hypothesis, probably socially 
efficient) property rights division.218  Put differently, the transition 
 
214 Catherine Besteman, Individualisation and the Assault on Customary Tenure 
in Africa: Title Registration Programmes and the Case of Somalia, 64 AFR.: J. INT’L AFR. 
INST. 484, at 498–99 (1994). 
215 See Klaus Deininger & Raffaella Castagnini, Incidence and Impact of Land 
Conflict in Uganda, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 321, 336 (2006) (discussing how the 
application of customary law in Uganda leads to less conflicts when compared to 
the newer formal titling system instituted by the 1998 Land Act). 
216 N. S. Jodha, Depletion of Common Property Resources in India: Micro-level 
Evidence, 15 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 261, 262 (1989); see also N. S. Jodha, Population 
Growth and Decline of Common Property Resources in Rajasthan, India, 11 POPULATION 
& DEV. REV. 247 (1985). 
217 Banner, supra note 197, at 365. 
218 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 71–73 (discussing the importance of 
community based solutions in sub-Saharan Africa where property rights are 
divided on a use basis); see also María E. Fernández-Giménez, Spatial and Social 
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from a functional to a spatial property system can entail significant 
costs and necessitate significant and potentially deleterious social 
reorganization.  While it is possible, theoretically, to formalize a 
functional property system and disaggregate all the rights over a 
certain piece of land, this would almost certainly be prohibitively 
costly, both to record the various rights initially as well as to keep 
track of various changes over time.219 
2.2.4. Social Unrest 
There may also be externalities to the process of assigning 
property rights in the form of social conflict.220  In addition to the 
possibility of conflict caused by the perceived illegitimacy of a new 
tenure system, there are two additional mechanisms through 
which formalizing land tenure can lead to social conflict.  First, 
proponents of titling and registration programs often implicitly 
assume that boundaries between property rights are clearly 
defined.  However, if such boundaries are undefined or fuzzy, 
titling programs can cause conflicting claims to the rights to 
surface.221  Two attempts by the Australian government to 
formalize land rights in Papua New Guinea created new land 
disputes, as individuals were concerned about losing customary 
entitlements and the accompanying finality of land holdings that 
resulted from the registration process.222  Returning to the Chinese 
case study, Ho argues that China has deliberately maintained a 
degree of legal ambiguity in its property rights arrangements in 
order to minimize conflict between groups and to allow for further 
 
Boundaries and the Paradox of Pastoral Land Tenure: A Case Study from Postsocialist 
Mongolia, 30 HUM. ECOLOGY 49, 50 (2002) (discussing how the spatial allocation of 
land in Mongolia is difficult because “spatial and social flexibility are intrinsic and 
essential characteristics of resource use patterns”). 
219 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 58 (noting that disaggregating use rights 
would be prohibitively costly in countries such as Zambia and Rwanda). 
220 See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The 
Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1009 (2006) (noting that 
those such as Demsetz and Coase who push for property rights as a way to 
internalize externalities “overlook the possibility that the allocation process will 
create its own externalities in the form of social conflict”). 
221 See Hanstad, supra note 27, at 666 (nothing that formalization of title when 
significant fragmented holdings existed created significant problems for Sicilian 
and Chinese landowners). 
222 Trebilcock, supra note 201, at 413 (noting that the very act of embarking on 
land registration precipitated disputes due to the “once and for all” nature of land 
registration). 
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development of property institutions in the future.223  Whether or 
not this has actually limited conflict is unclear, as land disputes 
have become increasingly frequent in rural China.224 
Second, where titling programs transfer title from absentee 
landholders to occupants instead of simply titling untitled state 
land, a relatively simple formalization program can encourage 
invasions by squatters.  In their study of land reform in the 
Brazilian rainforest, Alston et al. found that a government program 
designed to expropriate unused land from large landowners and 
transfer it to peasants actually increased land conflict by 
encouraging peasants to invade and squat on land and assert 
claims to this land under the principles of the government’s 
redistributive land policies.225  Thus, while a strong formal 
property rights regime can prevent conflict and wasteful 
competition for resources once such a regime is successfully 
instituted, the process of creating and formalizing such a regime 
can itself lead to significant conflict, at least in the short term. 
2.2.5. The Flaws of a Titling Process 
In other circumstances, the titling process itself can be carried 
out in such a way as to further marginalize already disenfranchised 
groups.226  Two such groups have been the focus of substantial 
study.  First, titling programs which destroy customary tenure can 
significantly erode women’s rights.  This can occur for a number of 
reasons.  The titling process will often provide title to land solely to 
men, while women will lose their customary rights.227  Lastarria-
 
223 HO, supra note 112, at 73. 
224 See PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 482–83 (discussing a recent land survey 
where many farmers felt insecurity in their tenure over their land). 
225 Lee J. Alston et al., A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy 
in Brazil, 4 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 135, 136 (1999). 
226 See generally Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights 
as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 DEV. & CHANGE 29, 39–46 
(1996) (arguing that land registration increases certainty but tends to deprive 
access to marginalized groups, reducing efficiency and security, and is feared to 
be manipulatable by the elite and educated to their advantage). 
227 See Besteman, supra note 214, at 495 (noting that once formal titling was 
instituted in Somalia, the cultural rights that women were once guaranteed under 
the Sharia were largely ignored); Carmen Diana Deere & Magdalena León, Who 
Owns the Land? Gender and Land-Titling Programmes in Latin America, 1 J. AGRARIAN 
CHANGE 440, 443 (2001) (noting that the most successful programs were those 
which came from nations such as Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua where 
women’s rights are independently protected); Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of 
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Cornheil notes that the move to a market for land may 
disenfranchise women as the market may not be gender-neutral.  
She points out that not only are there often institutionalized male 
biases against women owning land, but women also enter the 
market at a disadvantage due to their lack of cash or access to 
credit, lack of political power, and the fact that they have a family 
to maintain.228  Finally, the transition from a functional to a spatial 
property regime, as discussed above, can be particularly 
devastating for women, whose livelihood often depends 
significantly on certain limited use rights, such as rights to collect 
wood and access to grazing land.229  However, whether titling 
programs strengthen or weaken women’s rights depends on the 
implementation of the titling program as well as the strength of 
supporting institutions for women’s rights.  Where legal 
protections are otherwise strong for women, programs such as 
joint titling may actually strengthen their position relative to 
customary law.230 
The empirical evidence assessing the impact of titling programs 
on women’s rights is somewhat mixed.  While in some cases titling 
has eroded women’s customary rights, this has largely depended 
on how the titling program was carried out.  Deere and Leon’s 
study is illustrative.  They provide an overview of four different 
titling programs in Latin America and find mixed results, largely 
varying on how the program was executed and to what extent the 
program provided adequate legal protections for women rather 
than on the effect of titling itself.231  Gopal provides an account of 
 
Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1320 
(1997) (explaining how colonial lands switched from traditional tenure ownership 
in pre-colonial Africa with a greater variety of gender patterns, to personal 
property held by the head of the household). 
228 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 227, at 1326–27. 
229 See Thea Hilhorst, Women’s Land Rights: Current Developments in Sub-
Saharan Africa, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN AFRICA 181, 185 
(Camilla Toulmin & Julian Quan, eds., 2000) (describing the characteristics of 
female employment working the land, including their lack of incentives to 
develop the land, and what factors influence the extent of their agriculture 
activities). 
230 See Aili Mari Tripp, Women’s Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in 
Africa: The Case of Uganda, 7 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 11 (2004) (describing the push/pull 
effects of legal land rights and community-oriented ideals). 
231 Deere & Leon, supra note 227, at 443 (discussing how the implementation 
of formal titling programs in several Latin American countries has significantly 
undercut many women’s rights to land). 
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the impact of land reform on women in Kenya and Ethiopia and 
finds similarly mixed results.232  In Kenya, she finds that land 
tenure reform damaged women’s customary usufructury rights by 
not providing any adequate safeguards, thereby turning them into 
an “agrarian proletariat.”233  In Ethiopia, the land reform program 
was somewhat more successful, although by 1996, still only 18 
percent of landowners were female.234  Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 
however, come to a more pessimistic conclusion in their study of 
Cameroon.  They note that while customary rights granted women 
ownership over food crops and men ownership rights over tree 
crops, the titling process has tended to marginalize women’s 
claims as titles over the property were almost entirely granted to 
men.235 
Second, even in circumstances where the titling process would 
provide substantial benefits along the lines discussed by the 
formalists, differential access to formal titling because of 
differences in education, wealth, or political power can create 
inequitable results and actually dispossess individuals of their 
land.236  Even where registration is theoretically equally accessible 
to all, rural landowners may be misinformed and not fully 
understand the benefits of registration; conversely, elites may be 
able to manipulate the system and claim rights over large portions 
of land.  Moreover, in cases where there is any charge for titling—
or even when there are large indirect costs for registration, such as 
the requirement to travel a significant distance to the capital to 
register the land—wealthy elites will be significantly better 
positioned than the poor to reap the benefits from titling programs. 
There is indeed evidence that titling programs have in some 
cases disproportionately benefited the elites of a given society at 
the expense of the poor.  Feder and Noronha cite a number of 
studies indicating that it was chiefs and civil servants who had 
superior knowledge of the law that benefited from land 
 
232 GITA GOPAL, WORLD BANK, GENDER–RELATED LEGAL REFORM AND ACCESS TO 
ECONOMIC RESOURCES IN EASTERN AFRICA 2–3 (1999). 
233 Id. at 12–13. 
234 Id. at 13. 
235 Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures and Unexpected 
Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 1115, 1119 (1999). 
236 See Platteau, supra note 22, at 67–68 (discussing how the high level of 
wealth concentration in new formal title systems has led to a further concentration 
of wealth). 
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registration in Kenya.237  Similar manipulation was documented by 
Doornbos in Uganda’s titling program.238  However, it should be 
noted that, as with the discussion of the impact of titling on 
women’s rights, it is not titling itself which necessarily leads to this 
deleterious effect, but rather the manner in which it is carried out.  
While titling programs need not lead to the further marginalization 
of already marginalized groups, the impact of such programs on 
those groups cannot be ignored, as improperly designed programs 
can have deleterious consequences. 
2.3. Concluding Remarks on the Costs and Benefits of a Formal 
Property Rights Regime 
The above discussion of the costs and benefits of a formal 
property rights regime suggests that the picture is much more 
complex than many commentators and policy-makers have 
assumed.  The creation of a formal property rights regime is not 
costless, and it will not necessarily be the case that the benefits of 
such a regime will clearly outweigh the costs.  Given, however, 
that formal property regimes are ubiquitous in the developed 
world, there are reasons to believe that at a certain stage in a 
country’s economic development, a formal property rights regime 
is necessary to secure further economic development.239 
At low levels of development, an informal regime may be 
adequate to realize many of the benefits of private property.  
Where economic life is largely organized around small units such 
as the village, the mobility of the population is low, and resources 
such as land are not overly scarce, informal mechanisms will likely 
be sufficient to provide the benefits of private property.  Put 
differently, if individuals expect to be living in the same location, 
expectations of repeated interactions will create the conditions 
necessary for cooperation.  At this point, informal mechanisms will 
likely suffice to bring the benefits of private property, so a formal 
 
237 Feder & Noronha, supra note 58, at 156–57. 
238 Martin R. Doornbos, Land Tenure and Political Conflict in Ankole, Uganda, 12 
J. DEV. STUD. 54, 63 (1975). 
239 Indeed, this view seems consistent with China’s experience over the last 
three decades.  As discussed above, supra Section 2.1.5, China experienced rapid 
growth throughout the 1980’s without clear property rights.  However, as 
economic development has progressed, China has increasingly tried to create a 
functioning formal property rights system. 
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property regime would entail significant social and economic costs 
without significant benefits. 
As countries undergo economic changes, however, the relative 
benefits of a formal private property regime are likely to increase.  
There are three general reasons for this consequence.  First, as 
development increases, communities are likely to become less 
close-knit, leading informal norms to be less effective in 
maintaining order.  As Feder and Feeny note, “[w]ith more 
advanced stages of development and increased mobility of 
individuals and entrepreneurs, transactions among individuals 
who are not members of the same community are more 
frequent.”240  Where the proportion of one-off encounters increases 
relative to continuing encounters, traditional methods of social 
cohesion are likely to be strained.  Moreover, as Posner notes, 
while informal norms can often result in a strong degree of security 
for items which can be easily possessed, such norms will be 
inadequate to protect goods which individuals cannot directly 
possess, such as land or capital dispersed throughout a number of 
locations.241 
Second, at higher levels of economic development, the value of 
land, goods, and investments may increase substantially, leading 
to more substantial benefits from more secure property rights.  
While informal mechanisms may be sufficient to provide an 
individual with the incentives to make minor investments, more 
capital-intensive, asset-specific investments will likely require 
greater certainty and security.  Moreover, as the activities become 
increasingly capital-intensive, formal credit is likely to play a 
greater role in economic development, thereby increasing the 
benefits of clear and secure title. 
Third, at higher levels of economic development, the relative 
costs of creating a formal property regime may be lower.  As a 
country’s tax base increases, it will be relatively easier for the state 
to make the expenditures required for creating a formal property 
regime.  Where insurance markets are likely to be more developed, 
the loss of the insurance function of customary land tenure is likely 
to be less severe.  Similarly, where the state takes an increasingly 
large role in providing social benefits to its population, the equity 
 
240 Feder & Feeny, supra note 17, at 140. 
241 POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 56, at 178–79 (illustrating how 
“state intervention has raised welfare beyond the level produced by the evolution 
of norms” using possession-based resources as an example). 
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concerns of potential landlessness are likely to be mitigated.  
Finally, the very forces that undermine informal tenure can also 
mitigate the effects of increased landlessness and social unrest.  As 
mobility and migration opportunities increase, individuals will be 
more able to seek alternative economic opportunities elsewhere, 
thus lowering the cost to individuals of changes to property 
arrangements. 
The above considerations suggest that the focus of certain 
previous titling programs may have been misguided both in terms 
of the targets of these titling programs as well as in the content of 
the formalization program.  First, while many titling programs 
have focused on providing formal title to agricultural landowners, 
the above discussion suggests that, with the exception of newly-
settled frontier land, established social norms in rural areas may be 
sufficient to provide an adequate degree of informal property 
rights protection.  Urban titling programs, especially those aimed 
at newly-developing squatter settlements, may yield a greater 
social return.  The greatest return from titling programs may come, 
however, from providing formal ownership to firms’ land and 
assets, as informal norms may be lacking in such circumstances or 
inadequate to provide the certainty required for large investments 
or transactions entailing significant sunk costs and long pay-off 
periods.  Second, to the extent that there are substantial benefits to 
providing stronger land rights to agricultural landowners in a 
given case, those benefits may be largely realized through the 
recognition and formalization of customary land tenure.242  This 
model of formalization in the agricultural sector may bring about 
the benefits of security of tenure at a lower social cost than would 
the de novo creation of an individual-centered system of land rights.  
Both of these conclusions, however, should be taken only as 
general propositions, as the above discussion highlights how the 
analysis of relative costs and benefits of formalization is a highly 
context-dependent exercise. 
 
242 For an insightful exploration of many of these issues of institutional 
design, see Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Best Practice’ Options for the Legal Recognition of 
Customary Tenure, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 449 (2005), which argues that conventional 
law-and-economics theory fails to explain the development of open access in 
many Third World property systems and that rising resource values are more 
likely to lead to open access than private property when the institutional 
environment is characterized by competing legal and norm-based systems.  See 
generally DEININGER, supra note 5, at 62–65 (describing situations when eliminating 
or replacing customary tenure is neither necessary nor desirable). 
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Finally, it should be noted that while the above discussion has 
largely focused on titling, the examples show that in some cases the 
primary source of insecure property rights is not the threat of 
expropriation by other households or landowners, but rather from 
expropriation by the state.243  Where this is the main source of 
insecurity, formal title per se may not be necessary to increase 
individuals’ perceptions of tenure security.  Moreover, under such 
circumstances, formal title may not actually improve perceptions 
of tenure security, if individuals believe that they will not be able 
to enforce their property rights against a predatory state.244  Rather, 
what is required in such cases to create the perception of strong 
property rights is a credible commitment by the state not to 
expropriate land or other assets.245  This can be a significantly less 
costly and more effective mechanism for gaining the benefits of 
private property rights than formal titling programs. 
3. THE PRECONDITIONS FOR A FORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME 
A property rights regime does not exist in a vacuum, but rather 
its operation depends on its interactions with a number of related 
social institutions.  This Section will examine the social, market, 
and state institutions which are conducive to or necessary for the 
operation of a formal property rights regime.  Stated most 
generally, this Section will note that people may ignore the formal 
legal mechanisms and continue to adhere to informal norms if they 
find the latter to be more efficient and cost effective.246  A basic 
 
243 See Timothy Frye, Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from 
Russia, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 456–458 (2004) (noting that one of the largest 
threats to property rights in Russia was a fear that the state would expropriate 
private property); see also Razzaz, supra note 104 (discussing the Bani-Hassan 
tribe’s fear of expropriation from the Jordanian government). Various levels of 
government have been significant sources of property rights insecurity in China; 
for examples see supra text accompanying notes 122–24, 177. 
244 See Frye, supra note 243, at 457–58 (describing a survey of Russian 
businessmen finding that many believe that they will not be able to enforce their 
property rights against the state). 
245 See FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 12, at 97–100 (discussing the 
implications of state ownership of land and farmers’ incentives to work). 
246 See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at 15–28 (commenting 
on the irrelevance of formal law to the Shasta county ranchers); see also DE SOTO, 
supra note 7, at 154 (noting that in Peru extralegal entrepreneurs continue to work 
because it is more cost effective than actually complying with regulations); Feder 
& Noronha, supra note 58, at 163 (concluding that in certain circumstances 
societies that are not ready for formal titling should remain with communal 
systems so long as it is more cost effective); Pande & Udry, supra note 201, at 14 
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point made by many authors—and stressed by De Soto—is that 
individuals will be more likely to continue to operate in the 
informal sector as the relative cost of operating in the formal sector 
increases.247 
3.1. Informal Norms 
Because the state can neither perfectly enforce all of its laws nor 
can citizens turn to the state for complete enforcement of their 
rights, the success and effectiveness of a formal legal system 
depends heavily upon the relationship between law and social 
norms.  Law and social norms can in some circumstances be 
complementary.  This is particularly the case when the law 
formalizes generally accepted practices.248  This does not 
necessarily imply legal or normative stagnation; incremental or 
marginal deviations in the law from social norms can play a role in 
gradually modifying those norms, thereby suggesting a potential 
path for reform.249  Some authors have noted the existence of legal 
obedience norms.250  If individuals have internalized such a norm, 
then they may use the formal legal system, if the costs of doing 
so—either the transaction costs or the inherent disutility of 
breaching other norms—are sufficiently low.  Thus, whether legal 
reforms will be rendered less effective by social norms largely 
depends on how closely those legal reforms mirror social norms. 
The linkages between law and social norms may explain some 
of the successes of Papua New Guinea’s land courts—which in 
 
(stating that adherence to customary land rights in sub-Saharan Africa is done so 
because it is more cost efficient to enforce as opposed to formal legal rights). 
247 DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 154–55 (discussing how the only real method of 
effective enforcement against black markets is to make it prohibitively costly for 
merchants to operate); see also ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at 
105 (discussing how Shasta county rangers will not comply with closed-range 
ordinances so long as it is not cost effective to do so). 
248 See McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 43, at 4 (stating that legal norms 
and “real” norms are in less conflict when one is derived from the other). 
249 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 622–40 (2000) (discussing several instances, such as 
the change in drug laws, where norm reformers have been able to change the law 
by giving a “gentle nudge” in enforcement which ultimately led to a complete 
change in the law). 
250 See McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 43, at 17 (describing the concept of 
legal obedience norms as “an obligation to act in according with the law”); see also 
Kahan, supra note 249, at 607 (discussing the reluctance of decisionmakers to 
implement a law that alters a social norm). 
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some sense formalized customary title by preserving the 
customary rules for dealing with land251—as well as the 
corresponding failure of the conversion process to freehold in that 
country.252  A related example from Cameroon also lends some 
support to this point.  In many ways, the titling process in 
Cameroon was largely ineffective, with most farmers choosing to 
remain outside the legal system.  However, by the process 
established in Cameroon, once farmers began the title process and 
paid certain fees, state agents would come to place concrete 
boundary markers on their land; following this, many farmers 
would give up on the formalization process.  As Firmin-Sellers and 
Sellers note, while these boundary markers had no legal 
significance on their own, these markers enhanced tenure security 
because community members would believe that the land was in 
some sense backed by the state.  This state action actually enhanced 
tenure security, since it a) was a relatively low-cost signal of tenure 
security, and b) did not conflict substantially with customary law 
as it existed in Cameroon.253 
By contrast, there may be informal norms that militate against 
the use of a more effective formal legal system.  Kahan has noted 
that if norms conflict with the formal law, this may inhibit law 
enforcers from applying the formal law.254  Even beyond the law 
enforcers, if the formal law is in stark contrast with the norms of 
the individuals who are party to a dispute, they may simply avoid 
using it.  Most pessimistically, in some circumstances there may be 
norms against using the formal legal system and instead in favor of 
resolving disputes informally.255  In these circumstances, 
 
251 See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua 
New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759, 766–81 (1991) (describing customary rules 
for dealing with land in Papua New Guinea). 
252 Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law Versus the Rule-of-Law State: 
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development 38–40 (John M. Olin 
Working Papers in Law, Econ., and Inst. No. 96/97–3, 1996) (discussing the failure 
of conversion to freehold in Papua New Guinea); see also Trebilcock, supra note 
201, at 384–86 (discussing the aborted attempts to introduce registration systems 
in Papua New Guinea). 
253 See Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 235 (arguing that policy makers 
could redesign land tenure to give the state a more positive role). 
254 Kahan, supra note 249, at 607. 
255 See Rikke J. Broegaard, Land Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in Nicaragua, 
36 DEV. & CHANGE 845, 845 (2005) (discussing the “lack of enforcement” and “lack 
of impartiality” in the formal systems of Nicaragua); see also ELLICKSON, ORDER 
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individuals may be disinclined to make use of what might be a 
more efficient formal system. 
Applied to the context of property, this may suggest that some 
of the benefits which the formalists suggest will arise from land 
titling programs may not materialize because of the social context.  
For example, the ability to use land as collateral requires the ability 
of creditors to seize the land.  If, however, judges are unwilling to 
order that the land of a defaulting debtor be transferred to a 
creditor, or if creditors are for some other reason unable to 
effectively repossess the land because of local norms, the mere fact 
of titling will not enhance the ability of landowners to gain access 
to credit. 
Norms can also play in important role in encouraging or 
discouraging the evolution of the institutions necessary for the 
benefits from private property to be realized.  For example, 
Platteau has discussed how land markets will not develop as long 
as landowners feel, because of their own conceptions or because of 
social pressures, that their land is inalienable.256  Moreover, as 
Fitzpatrick points out, where common property arrangements are 
supported by and closely bound up with kinship structures, they 
may be exceptionally persistent in the face of external attempts to 
create a new property rights framework.257  Unsurprisingly, these 
considerations all suggest that one of the major determinants of a 
given formal property regime’s acceptance and success will be its 
compatibility with informal norms and customs. 
3.2. The Existence of Other Markets 
The mere fact that individuals have some manner of formal 
individual property rights will not necessarily lead them to the 
neo-classical profit maximizing outcome, at least as long as 
supporting markets are undeveloped.258  Imperfections in credit, 
 
WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51, at 123–36 (demonstrating how people often resolve 
their disputes in a cooperative fashion, without regard to formal legal systems). 
256 Platteau, supra note 22, at 56–57. 
257 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 220, at 1011–16 (discussing the importance of 
kinship networks in Third World societies). 
258 See Christopher Udry, Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit 
Maximization in African Agriculture (June 1996) (unpublished working paper, on 
file with Northwestern University Department of Economics) available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//pdf/separate.pdf (discussing the extent to 
which rural development is characterized by competitive markets). 
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land, and labor markets can diminish the relative benefits of formal 
private property rights. 
The existence of a well-functioning credit market is essential for 
many of the benefits of private property to be realized.  Although 
the economic theory discussed above suggests that the potential 
collateral created by titling programs will increase the supply of 
credit, formal title will not increase farmers’ access to credit if rural 
credit markets are themselves underdeveloped or imperfect.259  
This will most obviously be the case where there are either formal 
restrictions which impede the efficient development of credit 
markets or where creditors are unable to use the legal machinery of 
the state to enforce debtors’ obligations.260  Even absent such 
glaring failures, however, the transaction costs associated with 
lending may ration borrowers out of the credit market.261  Carter 
formally demonstrates how credit rationing can deprive smaller 
landholders of access to credit even in unrestricted credit markets 
because of adverse incentive and selection effects.262  There is some 
evidence suggesting that such credit rationing has occurred in 
practice.  Field and Torero examine the impact of a titling program 
in Peru, and they find that 34 percent of titled households remain 
rationed out of the credit market.263  Boucher et al. find similar 
evidence of small farmers being rationed out of the credit market 
in Honduras and Nicaragua.264  Such credit-rationing also explains 
the results of Carter and Olinto.265 
Such credit market inefficiencies can lessen the benefits of 
private property in a number of ways.  First, the potential supply 
of agricultural improvements is reduced, as smaller farmers are 
unable to acquire the requisite capital to make efficient 
 
259 See Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76, at 166 (arguing that land titles 
alone will not lead to the development of active rural credit markets); see generally 
Boucher et al., supra note 23, at 109–10 (discussing “market-friendly” reforms in 
Honduras and Nicaragua). 
260 On the second point, see Platteau, supra note 22, at 59–60. 
261 See Deininger & Feder, supra note 18, at 11 (suggesting that there are 
informal procedures with fewer transaction costs). 
262  Michael Carter, Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture, 28 J. 
DEV. ECON. 83 (1988). 
263 Field & Torero, supra note 83, at 16. 
264 See Boucher et al., supra note 23, 109–10 (discussing ongoing credit 
constraints for small farmers). 
265 See Carter & Olinto, supra note 89 (arguing that “the credit supply effect 
tends to favor large-scale producers). 
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improvements to their land.  Second, where credit markets are 
limited and the purchase of land cannot be effectively financed, 
land will not necessarily be transferred to the most efficient 
producers.266  Third, as Boucher et al. argue, the differential 
availability of credit can actual harm labor opportunities for poorer 
farmers, at least in the short-term.  This can occur because 
increased access to credit might allow large landowners to 
substitute away from labor in favor of capital-intensive farming, 
thus reducing the labor demand of large farmers.267  If this is 
coupled with newly titled landowners alienating their land to large 
landowners,268 the demand for rural labor might decrease 
substantially, with potentially negative socioeconomic 
consequences. 
The underdevelopment of land markets can also negate some 
of the benefits of more formalized private property rights.  
Although many scholars assume that the formalization of property 
rights will facilitate the operation of land markets, in certain cases, 
because of the failures of other markets or the existence of certain 
social norms, the land market may be highly underdeveloped.  
Where there is not an active market in land, the other benefits of 
strong private property rights may be lessened.  For example, if 
land markets are thin, land will be a highly illiquid form of 
collateral, thereby making it difficult for banks to foreclose 
mortgages; this will then hinder the ability of landowners to use 
their land as collateral to access credit markets.269  Moreover, if 
land is effectively inalienable, the value of improvements to land 
cannot be realized, thereby removing one of the avenues by which 
stronger property rights can increase investment. 
Further inefficiencies can occur if there are simultaneous 
imperfections in both land and labor markets.  Significant 
transaction costs in the labor market due to high search costs for 
labor or pronounced principal-agent problems can prevent 
households from employing an optimal amount of labor on their 
 
266 For the theoretical discussion and a survey of applicable literature, see 
Deininger & Feder, supra note 18. 
267 See Boucher et al., supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that capital-intensive 
farming methods might reduce labor opportunities). 
268 See text accompanying notes 206–207 (discussing problems of a landless 
class). 
269 Irving Gershenberg, Customary Land Tenure as a Constraint on Agricultural 
Development: A Re-Evaluation, 4 E. AFR. J. RURAL DEV. 51 (1971); Barrows & Roth, 
supra note 77, at 295. 
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plots, leading smaller households to be relatively less 
productive.270  Such labor market imperfections are less important 
if land rental or sales markets can transfer the use of that land from 
less efficient to more efficient producers.  However, in the presence 
of imperfections in both labor and land markets, formal property 
rights will not be sufficient to lead to efficient uses of land. 
3.3. An Effective State 
A formal property rights regime cannot simply be created by 
decree; rather, it requires the state to create and maintain a variety 
of institutions.  The most obvious set of necessary institutions are 
those which are directly responsible for the functioning of such a 
regime.  These include an effective method of recording claims 
such as surveys and a title registry which can issue title and record 
changes reasonably quickly, reliably, and inexpensively. 
Because these are often extremely complex systems, many 
states which have attempted to create such institutions and issue 
titles have been unsuccessful because of the significant 
inefficiencies in these systems.  An important related case study 
describes Kenya’s titling experience.271  There, the formal titling 
program begun in the 1950s was largely ignored.  Unregistered 
land transfers through informal procedures occurred frequently, 
leading to increased insecurity and litigation.272  Also problematic 
was the fact that people often entirely ignored deeds; ownership of 
land was determined by pre-existing informal networks.  Similarly, 
Firmin-Sellers and Sellers note that the formal titling program is 
Cameroon was irrelevant to most rural inhabitants, largely because 
of the exceptionally high costs—in the form of exceptionally long 
waits for title, corruption, etc.—of obtaining title.273  In 
 
270 See Holden et al., Market Imperfections and Land Productivity in the Ethiopian 
Highlands 30–32 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No. 
76, 2001) available at http://www.ifpri.org/divs/eptd/dp/papers/eptdp76.pdf 
(describing market imperfections in rural African economies).  For evidence and 
further discussion of labor market imperfections, see Udry, supra note 258. 
271 Simon F.R. Coldham, Land-Tenure Reform in Kenya: The Limits of Law, 17 J. 
MOD. AFR. STUD. 615 (1979); see also Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and 
Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59 AFR.: J. INT’L AFR. INST. 61 (1989) (describing Kenya’s 
titling experience). 
272 The opposite manifestation of this trend was apparent in Rwanda, where 
informal land markets developed because of the rapidly increasing value of land, 
despite the fact that such markets were illegal under Rwandan law.  André & 
Platteau, supra note 78, at 1. 
273 Firmin-Sellers & Sellers, supra note 235, at 118–20. 
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Madagascar, high costs associated with recording land transactions 
meant that the title registry became increasingly out of date over 
time; property was largely defined by informal documents noting 
land transfer and ownership status.274  In urban Vietnam, relatively 
few residents have taken advantage of titling programs because of 
the strict requirements for documentary evidence needed to prove 
residence as well as the fees involved in acquiring title.275 
In their study of the land registry program in St. Lucia, Barnes 
and Griffith-Charles come to a related but slightly different 
conclusion.  As with the above studies, they find that over time the 
formal property system is becoming increasingly irrelevant, as 
transfers in ownership fail to be recorded in the national registry.276  
Unsurprisingly, this is linked to the cost of recording such changes.  
Surprisingly, however, they find that landowners systematically 
overestimate the costs of formally recording land transfers.277  This 
indicates that even where actual costs of formalization are low, the 
higher perceived costs of formalization may dissuade individuals 
from using the formal system. 
While a successful formal property rights regime requires the 
creation of a number of specialized property-related institutions, it 
also requires the existence of a number of related state institutions 
that are necessary for the maintenance of the rule of law.  Without 
the existence of institutions, which allow property owners to 
enforce their rights, those rights are meaningless, and the formal 
regime will not bring the benefits which it is supposed to provide.  
Under these circumstances, individuals will continue to rely on 
informal mechanisms for securing their rights, which, as discussed 
above, can significantly limit economic development beyond an 
undetermined point.278 
 
274 Jacoby & Minten, supra note 79, at 465–69. 
275 See Kim, supra note 80, at 281–86 (discussing the documentation and 
enforcement of property rights in Vietnam, specifically contrasting title and legal 
papers). 
276 See Grenville Barnes & Charisse Griffith-Charles, Assessing the Formal Land 
Market and Deformalization of Property in St. Lucia, 24 LAND USE POL. 494, 500 (2007) 
(finding that land titling and registration are not sufficient to create and maintain 
a formal land market). 
277 Id. at 499. 
278 See Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey 
of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999) (arguing that sound 
judicial systems are important to economic growth and surveying some current 
studies). 
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The existence of a competent and uncorrupt judiciary is an 
important institution for the effective functioning of a formal 
property regime.  Without a judiciary that is perceived as 
competent, individuals will be unlikely to turn to courts to settle 
their disputes, leading to informal dispute resolution mechanisms, 
which may not provide individuals with complete legal protection 
of their property rights.  Similarly, where a corrupt and bribe-
taking judiciary is the norm, the costs of accessing the justice 
system are significantly raised for individuals.  This can also create 
disincentives for using the formal property regime. 
Even where the judiciary is perceived as being competent, 
honest, and fair, weak enforcement mechanisms can deter 
individuals from seeking to enforce their rights through the courts.  
Given the costs associated with litigation, individuals may be loath 
to litigate disputes if they believe that a favorable judgment will 
not be enforceable.279  For example, the problem of unenforceable 
judgments is severe in China.  Concerns about enforceability may 
also influence the judgment itself.  This problem has also been 
documented in China, where courts will be reluctant to make 
judgments that they believe are politically or socially 
unenforceable, such as evicting a tenant who has no place to go.280 
While an independent and effective judiciary is a necessary 
institution for individuals to be able to enforce their property 
rights, it is by no means sufficient.  Individuals also need the tools 
necessary to access those courts, i.e., lawyers.  Where lawyers are 
prohibitively expensive and legal aid programs are nonexistent or 
underdeveloped, poorer property owners may have difficulties 
enforcing their rights.  As noted above, this has been a significant 
problem in China, where rural farmers have had limited access to 
justice and thus have difficulty challenging the illegal decisions 
taken by the collective or local governments.281 
A functional police force is another institution that plays a 
critical role in enforcing and realizing the benefits of strong 
property rights.  A strong police force protects private property by 
deterring and preventing the commission of crimes against 
property as well as by apprehending those who commit such 
 
279 See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996) (describing weak 
judicial enforcement mechanisms in China). 
280 Id. at 33. 
281 PEERENBOOM, supra note 129, at 481–89. 
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crimes.282  Where the police are corrupt, individuals may be 
reluctant to turn to them; lower income households may 
particularly vulnerable, as not only might they be unable to afford 
the requisite bribes, they also have the fewest resources to privately 
enforce their property rights.  Similarly, in some states, the police 
function more as a guarantor of the government’s rule rather than 
as a protector of private citizen’s rights.  Under these conditions, 
property rights will effectively be weaker, as individuals will have 
fewer protections against the theft or vandalism of their property. 
3.4. Concluding Remarks on the Preconditions of a Formal Property 
Rights Regime 
While the previous Section of this Article concluded that the 
costs of a formal property rights regime may outweigh its benefits 
in some circumstances, this Section has sought to emphasize that a 
formal property regime is intertwined with a number of other 
social, economic, and legal institutions.  An evaluation of the 
operation and benefits of a formal property regime in a given 
country also necessarily involves an analysis of these related 
institutions, as the success of that property regime depends in large 
part on those institutions.  Indeed, this Section suggests that formal 
property rights institutions cannot simply be grafted onto any state 
or society.  These insights also suggest a number of related 
conclusions. 
The above analysis again demonstrates that there are no easy 
solutions to questions of economic development.  Even if some 
scholars are correct in asserting that the lack of formal property 
rights is a major reason for underdevelopment, the creation of a 
formal property rights regime is likely to require the strengthening 
or creation of a number of related institutions. 
This Section also reaches a similar conclusion to that of the 
Section 1.  Namely, this Section provides support for the 
proposition that a formal property regime will function more 
successfully in a more developed state.  Where an economy is 
characterized by the presence of some functioning market 
institutions, anti-market social norms relating to prohibitions on 
the transfer of land may be less prevalent or will be more 
malleable.  Moreover, where credit and labor markets are more 
 
282 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 63–64 (1999). 
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developed and the state has more resources and a greater capacity 
to provide legal protections, individuals will be more likely to turn 
to the formal system rather than relying on informal systems.  
Thus, this suggests that a formal property rights regime will be 
more likely to function successfully at medium rather than low 
levels of economic development. 
4.  THE PROCESS OF REFORM OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
REGIMES 
4.1. Evolutionary Changes in Property Regimes 
There is a sense in which the formal and informalist positions 
discussed above do not reflect a stark dichotomy of property rights 
regimes, but rather general loci along a temporal continuum in the 
evolution of property rights.  Indeed, a prominent view within the 
law and economics movement is that property rights will evolve in 
response to an increase in their relative benefits.283  On the one 
extreme of the spectrum is an open-access regime, where land is 
exceptionally plentiful and the costs of any form of private 
property rights outweigh the benefits.  As the relative benefits of 
private property increase, communal property rights that exclude 
outsiders may be a rational response to the economic situation.284  
As the relative benefits increase further, individual property rights 
may emerge, with—in an economically efficient world—the 
optimal degree of formalization occurring where the marginal cost 
of further formalization equals the marginal benefit derived from 
increased security and clarity. 
While greater privatization and formalization may emerge 
from more informal regimes as the benefits of such formalization 
increase and the costs of formalization decrease, it is important to 
identify precisely the major factors that drive this process.  
 
283 See generally Demsetz, supra note 11, at 350–54 (arguing that property 
rights emerge in response to new benefit-cost possibilities); ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51 (exploring how in close-knit groups informal norms, 
akin to property rights, develop to maximize the welfare of the group as a whole); 
North & Thomas, supra note 65 (examining the rise of the Western World with a 
focus on the role of property rights in creating incentives to drive economic 
growth). 
284 See Migot-Adholla et al., supra note 76 (analyzing how an indigenous 
African tenure system, a communal property system, has responded to changing 
economic circumstances such as increased population and commercialization 
pressures). 
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Anderson and Hill posit that privatization will increase as a) 
relative prices change such that the resource becomes valuable, b) 
technological advances decrease the cost of enforcing such rights, 
and c) collective action to enforce and recognize those property 
rights becomes relatively easier.285  If such evolution of property 
rights does indeed naturally occur, it might be the case that there 
are limits on what outsiders can and should do with respect to 
promoting property rights arrangements. 
In a more recent paper, Demsetz has expanded on his earlier 
work and identified three major sources of the changes in costs and 
benefits that have led towards the greater prevalence of private 
property.286  The first factor is the decreased importance of 
compactness to the overall economy, by which he means that 
private property will emerge as groups become less close-knit.  The 
second factor is greater productivity; as productivity increases, so 
does the “societal interest in arrangements that encourage effort 
and facilitate some sharing of the gains from this effort.”287  The 
third factor is the increased complexity of resource allocation 
problems.  Demsetz notes that as specialization of labor increases, 
coordination becomes more difficult.  While the price mechanism is 
a strong decentralized coordination mechanism, it requires a 
strong degree of certainty to function.  This degree of certainty is 
provided by formal property rights. 
Although the above accounts describe the conditions under 
which such transitions are expected to occur, they largely fail to 
identify a mechanism by which a transition between property 
rights regimes occurs.  The reasoning underlying much of the work 
is that such transitions are simply the product of rational 
individual or coordinated decisions to define and enforce stronger 
property rights,288 although some commentators recognize the role 
 
285 Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights, in 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 126–30.  
Libecap produces a similar list of factors, but the third factor above is replaced by 
“shifts in preferences and other political parameters.”  See GARY LIBECAP, 
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1989). 
286 Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition 
Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653 (2002). 
287 Id. at S663. 
288 Anderson and Hill argue that “the creation of new property rights begins 
with the heterogeneous entrepreneurial perception of new and different attributes 
or uses of a resource.  To keep the rents from this perception from being 
dissipated in a tragedy of the commons, the entrepreneur must contract to exclude 
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of the state in responding to and formalizing such changes.289  In 
general, the prediction here is primarily one of the efficient 
evolution of social norms with respect to land.  Demsetz’s 
prediction is manifested in the norms literature by Ellickson, who 
hypothesizes that “land rules within a close-knit group evolve so 
as to minimize its members’ costs.”290  Not only will social norms 
emerge to create order, as discussed above, but furthermore, those 
norms will evolve efficiently in response to exogenous changes.291 
There seems to be a significant body of empirical evidence in 
favor of this general pattern of efficient decentralized evolution.  
Alston et al. suggest that people have greater incentives to acquire 
formal title where land values increase, and confirm this in their 
analysis of the determinants of title registration on the Brazilian 
frontier.292  Micelli et al. show that in Kenya, where there is a 
system of voluntary conversion from communal trust land to 
individual ownership, the likelihood of conversion and gaining 
formal title is strongly dependent on the costs and benefits of 
doing so.293  Even in China, it may be that a process of Demsetzian 
evolution in property rights is occurring to some extent, subject to 
political economy considerations and intervention by the central 
government.  Following Demsetz’s reasoning, Liu et al. argue and 
provide empirical support for the proposition that property 
protections will be strongest in areas which are land scarce (i.e., 
where the value of the resource is highest), and where there are 
 
others from the value of his perception.”  Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, 
Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S489, S492–93 (2002). 
289 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 10–28 (“The ways in which politicians react to 
the demands of property owners and their competitors will importantly affect 
how property rights institutions are formalized and how wealth is distributed.”) 
290 Ellickson, supra note 15, at 1320.  This apparently efficient endogeneity of 
property regimes has led some to argue that the state should offer a fixed menu of 
property options in order to strike a balance between the economic efficiency that 
arises from the ability of individuals to use a number of property regimes, and the 
transaction costs that occur as the number of property regimes increases.  See 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing the 
strict standardization of the legal dimensions of property). 
291 ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 51. 
292 Alston et al., supra note 96, at 57. 
293 Thomas Miceli et al., The Demand for Land Title Registration: Theory with 
Evidence from Kenya, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 275 (2001). 
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significant off-farm opportunities (i.e., where the benefits provided 
by the insurance function of land are weakest).294 
Examples of this type of evolutionary process are also available 
from the developed world.  Anderson and Hill, in examining the 
American West, show how a trend from open access to private 
property occurred in response to the increasing benefits (greater 
population density, higher land values) and decreasing costs (the 
invention of barbed wire) of enforcing individual property 
rights.295  In his discussion of mineral rights in the United States, 
Libecap chronicles a relatively smooth emergence of property 
rights, as miners came to agreement relatively quickly about 
property rights and governments institutionalized these 
arrangements.296  In a different context, the development of water 
rights in the United States provides support for this thesis, as the 
relatively water-plenty Eastern states adopted the English system 
of riparian rights, while in the water-scarce Western states, the 
more individualized prior appropriation system emerged.297  In a 
study of the reversal of this evolutionary process, Haddock and 
Kiesling note that because the Black Death significantly decreased 
the scarcity of land, large amounts of land reverted from private 
land to open access, as it was no longer efficient to hold such land 
privately.298  If this evolution towards efficiency is a more general 
phenomenon, then it might be argued that the state’s role should 
be to facilitate, formalize, and enforce a variety of property rights 
regimes along the lines of those which have evolved in a given 
society. 
 
294 Shouying Liu et al., Dimensions and Diversity of Property Rights in Rural 
China: Dilemmas on the Road to Further Reform, 26 WORLD DEV. 1789, 1790–94 (1998). 
295 Anderson & Hill, supra note 196, at 169–72 (discussing the changing 
circumstances in the open plains that led to an investment in defining and 
enforcing property rights). 
296 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at ch. 3. 
297 Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law 
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 265–67 (1990); see also Anderson & Hill, supra 
note 196, at 176–78 (describing the riparian rights system that was implemented in 
as settlers moved into the West). 
298 David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S545 (2002). 
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4.2. Impediments to Evolutionary Regime Change 
There are at least three reasons why this ideal type of evolution 
may not occur in property regimes.  Each of these will be discussed 
in turn. 
4.2.1. The Property Regime as a Public Good 
First, it may be that certain components of the process of 
property rights formalization are public goods, which would be 
underprovided by rational individuals acting independently in the 
presence of collective action problems.299  For example, a central 
land registry might provide all registered property-holders with 
significantly enhanced tenure security compared to a customary 
tenure system, by reducing land disputes, but no individual 
property owner has an incentive to invest in creating such a system 
because of the significant costs involved.  Miceli and Keiyah 
formally model this problem and show that a universally welfare-
improving property system is unlikely to be voluntarily adopted 
by all property owners when there are costs involved, as property 
owners cannot fully internalize the benefits of the system.300 
This problem is likely to be more pronounced at higher levels 
of economic development.  At lower levels of economic 
development where communities are smaller and more close-knit, 
collective action problems can more easily be overcome through 
informal norms and practices.301  Moreover, the costs of creating 
and maintaining an informal property regime are lower than that 
of a formal property regime, thus making collective action 
problems easier to overcome.  Although this collective action 
problem is likely not a substantial problem in relatively informal 
property regimes, if a formal property regime is indeed an efficient 
institution at a certain level of development where the need for 
security of tenure is relatively high, then the collective action 
problem is likely to arise eventually. 
 
299 Banner, supra note 197, at S362–64 (discussing the collective action 
problem that arises when transitioning to a new property rights regime); see also 
DEININGER, supra note 5, at 23–25 (discussing property rights as a public good). 
300 Thomas J. Miceli & Joseph Kieyah, The Economics of Land Title Reform, 31 J. 
COMP. ECON. 246 (2003). 
301 Banner, supra note 197, at 362. 
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4.2.2. The Inefficiencies in Informal Regime Change 
Certain critiques suggest that norms and informal 
arrangements might actually be inefficient, at least for certain 
periods of time.  There are three reasons for this.  First, with respect 
to Ellickson’s thesis about the evolution towards efficiency of 
norms in close-knit groups, Eric Posner points out that norms 
produced in this setting will only be socially efficient for those in 
the close-knit group itself.302  In these circumstances, costs will be 
externalized as much as possible, meaning that group outsiders 
can be significantly harmed by such norms.  One might imagine 
manifestations of this in the context of property when dealing with 
norms that prohibit the transfer of fertile land to group outsiders.  
Indeed, André and Platteau have shown how increasing scarcity of 
land in Rwanda has led to the development of tighter restrictions 
on the customary rights of access to land for certain groups, 
including return-migrants, widows, and orphans.303  In an example 
from the developed world, Rose argues that a similar phenomenon 
occurred in the development of British water law.304  For a period 
of time, instead of leading to more formally demarcated private 
property rights, the increasing scarcity of water resources led to a 
status quo approach to water management whereby ancient water 
uses were privileged over newer ones; this represented an effort by 
previously advantaged groups to maintain their previously 
allocated water rights to the detriment of newcomers.305  As 
pointed out above, this may be especially problematic in situations 
where group membership is very inflexible and is supported by 
family or clan ties, because this may further entrench an otherwise 
inefficient arrangement.306 
Second, to the extent norms are sticky, reliance on norms may 
be extremely inefficient when there are significant lags in the 
adjustment of those norms to rapid exogenous changes, such as 
 
302 Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1697, 1698 (1996). 
303 André & Platteau, supra note 78, at 39–41. 
304 Rose, supra note 297, at 267–274. 
305 Id. at 273. 
306 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 220, at 1028–29 (arguing, for example, that “a 
norm-based system supported by kinship structures is more likely to respond to 
rising resource values by tightening its governance mechanisms or enhancing 
exclusionary rights”). 
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changes in population or technology.307  In the property context, 
this might suggest that norms which previously governed land use 
efficiently might lag in changing to significant exogenous changes 
in population or technology which make land relatively scarce.  
For example, while informal mechanisms of transferring land have 
developed, in situations where they were previously non-existent, 
there may be a significant lag leading to serious inefficiencies.  One 
author has argued that this problem was actually present in 
Demsetz’s case study of the Montagnais Indians, arguing that it 
took about two hundred years after the exogenous change in factor 
prices caused by the fur trade to lead to a greater degree of 
privatization in property relations.308 
Closely related to this problem is the issue of path dependence.  
It may be that in certain cases, arrangements which have long been 
inefficient will be preserved by the sheer weight of the myriad 
social layers and interactions that have emerged under those 
arrangements.309  The initial inefficient arrangement may be 
reinforced by subsequent actions.  As North writes, the “existing 
institutional structure [creates] organizations with a vested interest 
in the existing structure.”310  Where switching costs are, or appear 
to be, sufficiently high, this may prevent organic institutional 
change.  This notion of path dependence may explain the 
continued existence of some cases of inefficient property 
arrangements. 
Third, Mahoney and Sanchirico provide an alternative critique 
of the efficiency of norms based on game-theoretic analysis and 
norm evolution.  Using the evolutionary framework employed by 
Axelrod, discussed earlier,311 they point out that if the mismatch 
 
307 This lag in regime evolution is likely partially related to the costs of 
transitioning between regimes.  As Banner points out, there may be significant 
costs in the process of creating a new property rights regime.  See Banner, supra 
note 197, at S362 (explaining that establishing and enforcing a new system of 
property rights involves significant time and labor).  Changes in norms may also 
be sticky because individuals have internalized a norm and continue to act on it 
despite its inefficiency.  On internalization, see POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, 
supra note 56, at 43–44 (debunking a variety of legal theories which attempt to 
explain how law influences social norms). 
308 Posner, supra note 302, at 1712–13. 
309 For a discussion of various aspects of this path dependence, see DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 51–52, 156–157 
(2005). 
310 Id. at 160. 
311 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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risk312 of a norm is high relative to the gains from playing efficient 
strategies, then efficient norms are unlikely to emerge.  They note, 
for example, that both “always defect” and “tit-for-tat” are 
evolutionarily stable strategies, and that using a slightly different 
pay-off structure from Axelrod’s analysis, and assuming random 
mutations, it is quite likely for the equilibrium to tip from “tit-for-
tat” to “always defect,” but not vice versa.  Thus, they show that 
the evolution towards efficient norms is highly dependent on the 
particular costs and benefits of the various arrangements and that 
such evolution may not occur, even when it would be socially 
beneficial.313 
4.2.3. A Political Economy Model of Change in Property Regimes 
Finally, there are some authors who explicitly reject the 
efficient evolutionary framework in favor of a political economy 
framework for understanding changes in property regimes.  Under 
this model, changes in property rights regimes occur when groups 
have sufficient political power to induce a property regime change 
that benefits their interests.314  Libecap similarly notes that 
decisions about property rights institutions are made through the 
political process and that influential groups can have a significant 
impact in determining the property regime, irrespective of 
efficiency considerations.315  Because there are costs to creating and 
implementing a new property regime, relatively small groups will 
have an incentive to cooperate to facilitate regime changes where 
the benefits are concentrated in their hands and the detriments are 
 
312 A norm has mismatch risk if it is Pareto optimal when played against 
itself, but does relatively poorly against disparate norms. 
313 Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social 
Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2027 (2001). 
314 See Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S421, S421–27 (2002) (claiming that the “prevailing arrangement of 
property rights may be the product of politics and interest group-activity”).  See 
Jean Ensminger & Jack Knight, Changing Social Norms: Common Property, 
Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy, 38 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 1, at 4–5 (1997), for a 
survey of the competing positions of efficient norm evolution and norm evolution 
as triggered by distributional benefits.  See also Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions 
as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10481, 2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/W10481.pdf, for a historical analysis which argues 
that property rights arrangements are primarily determined by political 
considerations. 
315 LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 4–5. 
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widely dispersed among a large segment of the population.316  
Sonin provides an alternative model that suggests that the rich 
may favor poor property rights protection.  Because of their 
wealth, the rich may be able to provide private protection for their 
own property while using that same private enforcement power to 
expropriate others’.317  Thus, under a political economy framework 
of property rights, there is no reason to believe that property 
arrangements will naturally evolve towards efficient institutions; 
indeed, under certain circumstances, the reverse may occur. 
Moreover, even where changes to the property regime would 
be efficient, under a bargaining or political economy framework of 
property rights, difficulties in bringing about those changes may 
lead to an inefficient status quo bias.  To the extent that significant 
agreement is required among different members of a group for 
changes in property regimes to take place, certain group 
characteristics might make such consensus harder to achieve.  As 
Libecap notes, as the number of interest groups increases or the 
heterogeneity of the interest group’s preferences increases, 
agreement will be more difficult to achieve.318  Libecap argues that 
the presence of large numbers of heterogeneously-skilled 
fisherman was a major impediment to the development of efficient 
property arrangements in American fisheries.319 
There is some evidence that political economy explanations 
have some degree of validity when applied to questions of Chinese 
property reform.  Some authors have argued that village leaders 
play an important role in designing property arrangements for 
their villages.  Recognizing that a diversity of arrangements exist 
throughout China, Rozelle and Li argue that a village leader’s 
choice of a particular property regime will depend not only on the 
general benefits to the village, but also on the personal interests of 
 
316 See Banner, supra note 197, at S369 (recognizing that “[a] relatively small 
number of people who anticipate disproportionately large gains from a transition 
will have a greater incentive to cooperate in organizing the transition than would 
a larger number of people anticipating gains more equally distributed”); LIBECAP, 
supra note 285, at 5–6 (discussing the need for share concession or a side payment 
scheme to compensate those who would otherwise oppose property right change). 
317 Konstantin Sonin, Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, 
31 J. COMP. ECON. 715 (2003). 
318 See LIBECAP, supra note 285, at 21–24 (examining factors that influence 
political conflict over distribution and the likelihood of agreement on institutional 
change). 
319 Id. at ch. 5. 
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the leader, as well as the administrative cost of administering a 
given system.320  Such political economy considerations might also 
help explain certain elements of the 2007 Property Law, which 
provided certain concessions to the increasingly politically 
important urban middle class—such as rights to parking spaces for 
urban dwellers—while arguably changing little for rural farmers.321 
4.3. Responding to Evolutionary Failure:  The Role of Outsiders 
It is important to note that these different impediments to the 
Demsetzian evolution of property rights call for different responses 
from outsiders in helping to craft reforms for property rights 
regimes in developing countries.  These responses point to the fact 
that a one-size-fits-all solution to creating efficient property 
arrangements is unlikely to be successful.  From a policy 
perspective, when outsiders identify a state in which an alternative 
property arrangement would be more efficient than that already in 
place, a necessary prerequisite to an effective plan for remedying 
that inefficiency is an understanding of why that inefficient 
arrangement has persisted. 
If property arrangements have reached a point of sufficient 
formalization such that certain aspects of the property regime have 
the characteristics of a public good, then the role for outsiders is 
largely limited to providing sufficient resources to the state in 
question to allow it to overcome this collective action problem.  
Expert advice may also be required to help those states with the 
challenge of designing and implementing a formal property 
regime.  Resources and advice may also be required to help those 
states bolster other complementary institutions.  In these 
circumstances, once the resources and expertise are provided, the 
new property arrangement should be quickly adopted, because, by 
hypothesis, the aggregate benefits to individuals of such private 
property rights will outweigh the costs. 
Where the informal evolutionary regime of property 
arrangements has become inefficient, a much more active role is 
required by both the state and outsiders to create an efficient 
property regime.  The first and most obvious challenge is 
 
320 Scott Rozelle & Guo Li, Village Leaders and Land-Rights Formation in China, 
88 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1998). 
321 Property Law, supra note 115.  For a critique, see ECONOMIST, supra note 
115 (describing the critiques of the left that consider the 2007 law to be 
unconstitutional). 
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determining that a particular set of norms is inefficient.  Posner 
lists five situations in which the state should take action because of 
inefficient norms: 
 
(1) If the group members tell the state, or its agents, that the 
norm is inefficient or change is desired. 
(2) If there is extensive bargaining around a norm. 
(3) If there is rapid economic or technological change.322 
(4) If there are highly unequal endowments of group members. 
(5) If the state detects inefficiencies before the group does.323 
 
Once an inefficient arrangement has been identified, the 
problem remains of crafting an appropriate and efficient solution 
as well as a strategy for implementing that solution.  As above, this 
may involve significant amounts of financial support and 
expertise.  However, in contrast to the first scenario discussed 
above, policymakers face the additional hurdle of ensuring that the 
inefficient norms that the new formal system seeks to eliminate do 
not instead render that system ineffective.  Thus, any new system 
must be sensitive to existing social norms regarding property.  As 
discussed above, not only must the new system be obviously 
superior to existing norms, but moreover, the new system must be 
perceived to be accessible at low cost relative to its benefits, and, 
when involving mechanisms that entail marked changes from 
entrenched social norms, should be introduced gradually or on a 
voluntary basis.324 
While the successful implementation of new property 
arrangements by either the state or outsiders may be difficult 
 
322 This is precisely the situation in which André & Platteau suggest the state 
should intervene. See André & Platteau, supra note 78 (describing the rapid 
economic changes in Rwanda resulting in unequal land distribution, rising social 
tensions, and ultimately contributing to the civil war in 1994). 
323 Posner, supra note 302, at 1726–27 (suggesting ways in which the state may 
identify inefficient norms). 
324 See supra text accompanying notes 254–256, 271–275; see also Thrainn 
Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW, supra note 13, at 73, 77 (discussing the 
economic consequences of open access on both the supply and demand side); 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Comment on “The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: 
Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations of Development,” by Robert D. Cooter, in 
ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1996, at 229 
(Michael Bruno & Boris Pleskovic eds., 1997) (discussing incentives of 
governmental and economic actors to switch to new norms). 
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where inefficient norms are relatively stable and effective for at 
least certain groups, the case for active intervention is much 
stronger where land governance norms are breaking down.  
Extremely rapid changes in land scarcity have in some cases also 
led to increased land conflict, as inefficient norms have broken 
down without new norms emerging to replace them.  In these 
circumstances, litigation or more violent means have consumed 
significant resources in resolving disputes,325 and there may be a 
significant role for the government or external actors to identify 
such problems and craft appropriate solutions. 
While the above discussion optimistically suggests that the first 
two impediments can largely be overcome through the provision 
of resources and expertise, where an inefficient arrangement exists 
because of political economy considerations, no simple solution 
exists.  Where an existing inefficient property arrangement benefits 
certain actors, those actors will resist attempts to change that 
regime.  If the state is exceptionally weak or is captured by those 
actors who benefit from the inefficient regime, then the provision 
of resources or expertise is likely to have no impact, as the state 
will be unwilling or unable to use those resources to implement the 
new property regime.  Under such circumstances, a successful 
property regime change would require either strengthening those 
groups in favor of the reform, or convincing elites to accept 
changes either through rewards or sanctions.  Although this is not 
the appropriate context to elaborate or propose theories of the 
political economy of property rights reform, the point remains that 
under these circumstances, the introduction of formal property 
rights would be significantly more difficult and could not be 
accomplished by even the best-designed World Bank titling 
program. 
 
325 On Kenya, see Barrows & Roth, supra note 77 for a discussion on land 
tenure and investment in African agriculture. On Rwanda, see André & Platteau, 
supra note 78, which describes the rapid economic changes in Rwanda resulting in 
unequal land distribution, rising social tensions, and ultimately contributing to 
the civil war in 1994.  See also DEININGER, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing how 
disputes over land create a myriad of negative impacts and consequences); 
Fitzpatrick supra note 220, at 1031–33 (explaining how an inability to prevent 
resource use from outside groups can result in norm-based regime deterioration 
and intercommunity conflict); Karim Hussein et. al., Increasing Violent Conflict 
Between Herders and Farmers in Africa: Claims and Evidence, 17 DEV. POL’Y REV. 397 
(1999) (discussing competition and violent conflict over natural resources between 
herders and farmers in Africa). 
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4.4. Concluding Remarks on the Process of Reform of Property Rights 
Regimes 
While the discussion of the first two questions raised in this 
Article adopted a static approach to the examination of property 
regimes, this Section has adopted a dynamic approach and 
examined potential paths for the development of property regimes 
over time.  As in the above Sections, this Section suggests that the 
issue of whether outsiders should support the creation of a formal 
property rights regime is far from clear.  The lack of a strong 
formal property regime in a given state may represent a lack of 
resources or some other evolutionary failure which calls for the 
assistance of outsiders.  However, the absence of a formal property 
regime may also simply reflect the fact that such a regime would 
be inefficient in the circumstances.  Thus, an analysis of whether or 
not a titling program would benefit a given state necessarily 
involves understanding why a formal property system does not yet 
exist in that state. 
Moreover, as highlighted extensively in the preceding Section 
on the preconditions for a formal property rights regime, this 
Section has further demonstrated that the success of a formal 
property rights regime is highly dependent on the context.  The 
same impediments blocking the efficient evolution of the property 
regime can also operate to render ineffective those very programs 
which attempt to overcome those hurdles.  It cannot simply be 
presumed that the external provision of funding or expertise to 
create the framework of a formal property regime will be sufficient 
to ensure its successful adoption.  Indeed, the same costs, 
inefficient social norms, or political interests that precluded the 
endogenous development of a formal property rights regime may 
similarly hinder the successful operation of that regime even after 
the institutional framework of that regime has been created. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The above discussion has highlighted many of the issues 
surrounding property rights and development.  Because of the 
complex interactions between a property rights regime and the 
social, economic, political, and legal framework within which such 
a regime operates, it is not fruitful simply to argue for or against 
the formalization of a property rights regime.  Rather, the 
relationship between property rights and development is much 
more complex, and a more nuanced approach to these issues is 
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required.  As North writes, “[t]he first requirement for improving 
economic performance is to have a clear understanding of the 
sources of poor economic performance.”326  This statement 
certainly applies to the relationship between property rights and 
economic performance. 
The context-dependence of successful property regimes leads 
to three important considerations.  First, property formalization 
programs must not be considered as isolated economic 
development projects as one might consider certain physical 
infrastructure projects.  Rather, such programs must be considered 
as part of a general framework for economic development, 
typically including a wider set of reforms aimed at the promotion 
of the rule of law.327  Contrary to the optimistic rhetoric of De 
Soto’s work,328 property formalization programs are not by 
themselves the key to unlocking the potential of the developing 
world.  While a formal property regime may be a necessary 
condition for economic growth beyond a certain level of 
development, it is by no means sufficient. 
Second, in determining what role outsiders can play in helping 
promote a state’s formal property regime, it is essential to ask a 
broader question about the similarities between optimal property 
regimes.  If the optimality of a property rights regime is context-
independent, then a titling program developed by theorists in 
Washington or from elsewhere in the developed world may indeed 
be applicable and beneficial to extremely diverse countries.  
However, because the characteristics of a property regime are 
highly dependent on local context, it is unrealistic to expect that 
one model of a successful regime would be applicable across 
various states.  In fact, one would expect that the characteristics of 
property regimes as well as strategies for their implementation will 
differ substantially across states.  This suggests that, in practice, 
local or regional models of property regimes may be more 
successful than Western models.329 
 
326 NORTH, supra note 309, at 163. 
327 DAM, supra note 1, at ch. 10 (examining the implications of a rule-of-law 
approach to economic development). 
328 DE SOTO, supra note 7. 
329 For recent work on this notion see Sharun W. Mukand & Dani Rodrik, In 
Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic 
Performance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 374 (2005), which argues for implementation of 
appropriate policies and institutional arrangements on the local level. 
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Finally, significant changes to property regimes should be 
approached with caution and drastic, uniform top-down property 
changes should be avoided.330  Contrary to conventional economic 
thinking, the formalization of property rights is not necessarily 
desirable at all stages of development or for all property owners.  
Formalization programs can have far-reaching social and economic 
consequences, and under certain conditions, formalization 
programs can have negligible or deleterious impacts.  The context-
specificity of property rights regimes is not, however, a reason for 
inaction or a reason to counsel against the formalization of 
property rights in all cases.  As noted above, under some 
circumstances, formal property rights have increased efficiency 
and led to economic growth, and it would thus be poor policy 
never to support the formalization of property rights. 
Because of these considerations, unless there is clear and 
compelling evidence pointing to the need for a systematic state-led 
formalization program, the optimal response may be a voluntary 
and sporadic system of title registration.  Although a sporadic 
program of title registration is not without its own costs,331 such a 
program brings substantial benefits relative to a systematic 
formalization program.  As one of the Authors has argued 
elsewhere, in the face of limited resources and state capacity, a 
sporadic system of land registration has the benefit of providing 
the additional security and clarity of formal property rights to 
those desiring it most.332  By simply providing an additional 
vehicle for owning property, a sporadic registration program does 
not require disturbing the arrangements of those groups that are 
content with the status quo.  Where customary arrangements limit 
individuals’ economic opportunities, the option of formalization is 
present.  These characteristics suggest that such a system can 
operate as the backbone of an efficient Demsetzian evolution of 
property regimes.  Moreover, a voluntary system overcomes the 
collective action problem of providing the machinery for the 
 
330 For a classic paper exploring the importance of avoiding drastic imposed 
changes see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).  See also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN 
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). 
331 Trebilcock, supra note 201, at 412 (using the example of Papua New 
Guinea to elucidate the costs that accompany a sporadic program of title 
registration). 
332 Id. at 412–413. 
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enforcement of those property rights by having the state provide it 
and allowing people to opt into it. 
Perhaps the strongest benefit, however, of a sporadic and 
voluntary formalization system is that it avoids the myriad 
unforeseeable and potentially negative consequences that can 
result from the top-down imposition of a uniform system of 
property arrangements.  As this Article has stressed repeatedly, a 
property rights regime is not an isolated institution, but rather an 
institution which has strong interrelationships within a variety of 
other institutions.  In such circumstances and where policymakers 
have imperfect or limited information, it may be impossible to 
predict all the potential consequences flowing from drastic 
institutional changes, and unpredictable negative consequences 
may emerge from imposed changes.333  A gradual and reversible 
process of voluntary change at the individual level can mitigate 
such potentially harmful consequences. 
Even in situations where a systematic program is clearly 
superior to a voluntary program, drastic and irreversible changes 
should be avoided.  Rather, changes should be incremental in 
nature.  For example, where communal property is prevalent, 
rather than registering individual titles to specified plots of land to 
the exclusion of all others, a rudimentary titling program could be 
undertaken utilizing simple compass and chain rather than full-
scale cadastral surveys where only the base group title would be 
registered without prejudice to the various functional rights that 
others might possess under customary law.  Landowning groups 
might also be given a more formal legal structure and clearer 
decision or governance rules (akin to private corporations with 
restrictions on share transferability), while maintaining limits on 
outright alienability of group land.334  Such programs lessen the 
potential for serious social conflict or disruption from abrupt legal 
change and facilitate an evolutionary process for the emergence of 
strong private property rights. 
 
333 For interesting examples relating to this point, see SCOTT, supra note 330.  
See also Rachel E. Kranton & Anand V. Swamy, The Hazards of Piecemeal Reform: 
British Civil Courts and the Credit Market in Colonial India, 58 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (1999) 
(discussing how reform led to increased competition among lenders, and the 
resulting effects on the farmers of India). 
334 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 242 (discussing the circumstances in 
which different models of property rights may work); Trebilcock, supra note 201 
(discussing various approaches to the phenomenon of communal land rights 
evolving to private property). 
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